As uncertainty punctuates West Asia’s day-to-day, a new defence pact has emerged, sparking debate over a potential restructure of regional security alliances.
On September 17, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, accompanied by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshall Asim Munir, met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh and signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement- formalising their bilateral defence partnership into a structured alliance. As per the joint statement, the agreement “aims to develop aspects of defense cooperation between the two countries and strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression.” But what comes next has drawn the most attention. “The agreement states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.”
This essentially means a NATO-style collective security guarantee where both sides present a united front against an attack on either. This has been described as a “watershed moment” for the Gulf, reflecting anxieties and a waning trust in the U.S. security blanket.
A Saudi-Pakistani defence deal is neither unexpected nor unprecedented. The two countries have maintained close military ties for decades, and Saudi officials also noted that the agreement had been in the works for some time. What lends it significance, however, is the language and timing of the announcement.
Though described as “not a response to specific countries or specific events,” the deal comes on the heels of the emergency Arab-Islamic summit convened after Israel’s September 9 strikes on a Hamas delegation in Doha. This was Israel’s most provocative strike yet—violating the sovereignty of Qatar and hitting a key American ally and host of the largest U.S. military presence in the region. American failure to prevent, if not tacitly permit, such an attack highlighted Israeli impunity and exposed the limitations of the U.S. security guarantees, forcing a rethink of the strategic calculus among Gulf nations.
While other responses were limited to rhetoric, the Saudi-Pak deal marks the first tangible action taken in the aftermath of this episode and is being widely viewed as a window into the Gulf mindset. Pakistan, the only nuclear nation among the OIC, is also seen trying to take on a larger role, positioning itself as a counterweight to Israel, West Asia’s sole nuclear power.
The Nuclear Prospect
A crucial element of this new deal is the possible nuclear umbrella Islamabad can extend to Riyadh to deter threats to Saudi sovereignty. While the text of the agreement isn’t public yet, Saudi officials described the agreement as a “comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means,” hinting at the nuclear cover. At the same time, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif gave conflicting statements, first saying that Pakistan’s “capabilities will absolutely be available under this pact” and then telling Reuters the nuclear weapons were “not on the radar.”
The idea of Pakistan as a de-facto nuclear shield for Saudi Arabia isn’t new. The Kingdom has been linked to Pakistan’s nuclear program for years, with reports suggesting that Saudi Arabia bankrolled Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1990s. In 1994, a UN diplomat also defected with several thousand documents including one with information about a pact where Pakistan would retaliate against any nuclear attack on Saudi Arabia. In fact, the recent deal has resurfaced a popular anecdote from veteran journalist Bob Woodward’s book where he recounts the Saudi Crown Prince reportedly quipping with U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham, saying “I don’t need uranium to make a bomb. I will just buy one from Pakistan.”
This is an indicator of confidence in Pakistan’s support with or without a formal pact. As unpredictability grows in the region, a formalised arrangement carries greater symbolic weight and deterrence, especially given that Pakistan does not adhere to a “no first use” policy. Still, the nuclear element of this agreement should not be overstated, especially given the U.S. influence on both.
Was the U.S. left out?
Media reports suggest Washington was informed of the deal after it was signed. As a result, some analysts are referring to this as America’s “Suez moment,” hinting at waning American influence in the region. However, given the close cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. and the several lunches and audiences Pakistan has received with the Americans this year, it is unlikely this deal went ahead without prior intimation of the U.S.
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. share one of the region’s strongest defence partnerships. Earlier this year, during Trump’s May visit to Saudi Arabia, Riyadh announced its decision to invest $600 billion in the U.S., including a historic $142 billion defence sales agreement. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is also seeking American assistance with its civil nuclear program. Initially, American assistance with Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear program was tied to Riyadh normalising ties with Israel; however, the latter’s ongoing assault in Gaza and disregard for Palestinian statehood have led to the U.S. uncoupling the two issues, at least for now.
Further, as Saudi Arabia was finalising this deal with Pakistan, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were undertaking the region’s largest live-fire C-UAS exercise, and on the very day of the announcement, the Saudi Crown Prince also held a meeting with the new CENTCOM chief, Admiral Brad Cooper.
Therefore, Riyadh may be hedging bets with Pakistan, but it is viewing it more as an additional layer of security as opposed to a replacement of the U.S. guarantee.
What about India?
The mutual security guarantee of the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact has stirred some worry in Indian circles. If India was to resume Operation Sindoor or target terrorist camps on Pakistani soil, how might the Gulf react under this new agreement? Traditionally, India has warned against foreign intervention in its stand-offs with Pakistan. Despite that, during Operation Sindoor, India witnessed Pakistan’s allies supporting Bunyan-un-Marsoos, even without institutionalised guarantees. Would this deal add Saudi Arabia to that list? Unlikely.
When questioned by a Pakistani journalist about Saudi Arabia getting involved in a hypothetical India-Pakistan stand-off, Asif was quick to say, “Yes absolutely. There’s no doubt about it.” However, the likelihood of Saudi Arabia lending major support to Pakistan against India is faint.
In case of a stand-off, Saudi Arabia will face pressure to support Pakistan, but it won’t be through troops or even weapons- that’s Pakistan’s end of the deal. Riyadh’s support will likely be financial- bankrolling Pakistan’s military program, extending its loans, and even giving it the purchasing power to get advanced American weaponry. Thus, while the agreement talks of a mutual security guarantee, the burden of that security is largely borne by Pakistan, while Saudi Arabia is expected to grease the wheels from behind.
The deal also impacts the India Middle East Europe Corridor. The project is already stalled due to Israel’s assault on Gaza and the collapse of the Saudi-Israel normalisation. This new nuclear dimension only further complicates the future of the corridor.
Still, India doesn’t seem too rattled, giving a measured response, saying they were aware that such a deal was under consideration and that they “will study the implications” of this on our national security. Saudi Arabia, too, for its part, has emphasised that its new partnership is independent of its ties with India. “Our relationship with India is more robust than it has ever been. We will continue to grow this relationship and seek to contribute to regional peace whichever way we can,” a Saudi official told Reuters.
Leverage or Liability?
The Saudi-Pakistan deal is a headline grabber, but how its mutual security clause will translate into action remains unclear. On paper, Pakistan has gained credibility and fresh clout, though the likelihood of it deploying its nuclear arsenal against an adversary like Israel remains implausible. Still, the agreement cannot be dismissed as purely symbolic.
It’s evident that Israel’s actions, and Washington’s failure or unwillingness to rein them in, have put the region at unease and raised doubts on American commitments. Still, with Pakistan’s U.S. rapprochement, it is safe to assume some level of U.S. knowledge or even puppeteering behind this development.
The sheer prospect of an alternative nuclear umbrella has caught the eye of other Gulf partners. Reports are doing the rounds that the UAE and Qatar are also considering a similar arrangement with Pakistan. The idea of a joint Arab defence framework or an “Arab NATO” is also gaining momentum. However, any such development places Pakistan, and its nuclear deter-rent program, at the centre of West Asia’s security dynamics and while that looks like leverage, it could just as easily risk dragging the region deeper into volatility. Hinging it on Pakistan’s nuclear program also raises serious concerns about the nuclear proliferation network and escalation dynamics in the region.
Finally, this deal impresses a harsh truth for India: Pakistan is elevating its profile in West Asia. While India’s own partnerships in the region are far more secure, New Delhi may want to restructure its collaborations with West Asian allies, insulating them from Islamabad’s influence.
