Phrases have always been a part of Chinese cultural discourse. Similarly, they have found a place in the post-colonial iteration of China i.e., People’s Republic of China (PRC). Communist Party of China’s (CPC) leaders have used slogans or phrases since 1950 as a tool of power demonstration or for introducing major policies. This article explains how these phrases find their way into academic discourse and why they are surrounded with ambiguity when first introduced.
Deciphering the slogans or phrases given by the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) core leaders is often a tedious and frustrating exercise[i]. Such slogans are usually mired in ambiguity and left to the imagination of scholars and party cadre to make sense of. Few of those slogans are Mao’s “Bombard the Headquarters”; Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (中国特色社会主义, Zhōngguó tèsè shèhuìzhǔyì); Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” (「三个代表」重要思想 `Sān gè dàibiǎo’zhòngyào sīxiǎng); and Xi Jinping’s “Dual Circulation of Economy” ( 国内国际双循环, guónèi guójì shuāng xúnhuán). Other recent phrases that have made their way into official Chinese scholarly discourse are “Great Changes Unseen in a Century” and “New Cycle in the Development of International Relations”.
Mainstreaming of Phrases
Usually, a phrase is introduced by a senior Party Leader at a public event, policy speech or a public meeting. The broader meaning of such phrases can usually be grasped by the reader. However, their details remain vague and open to interpretation. This starts a competition, where Party officials and State affiliated scholars compete to make sense of the new term, that results in the incorporation of ideas of scholars or officials in the official explanation of the phrase, and some see their ideas embraced in the implementation of policy.
For example, Xi Jinping first mentioned “Dual Circulation of Economy” in May 2020 in a Standing Committee of the Politburo Meeting[ii]. At that time Xi did not expand on the idea and left it to the imagination of scholars and officials to interpret it. This sent scholars, both inside and outside China in a frenzy. Some were of the opinion that China will close itself to the world again, some interpreted it as “end of reforms and opening up” and some interpreted it as a “mix of reforms and self-sufficiency”[iii]. Dual circulation was officially introduced in the 14th Five-Year Plan released in March 2021[iv] and alluded to a model that focused on “self-reliance” while building indigenous industrial capacity to overcome technological, manufacturing, and consumption bottlenecks as envisioned in the scholarly work done since the first introduction of the phrase.
Why the Ambiguity?
China is a large and diverse country with more than 50 ethnic groups and a 1.4 billion population. This makes governance a challenge. In such conditions ambiguity is useful, as detailed ‘ukase’ would impinge on the provincial leaders’ ability to flexibly deal with the evolving crisis, whereas ambivalent guidelines would allow the local leaders to adapt to the crisis at hand and deal with it accordingly. Ambiguity is also used as a tool by the Party leadership to avoid scrutiny, should anything untoward happen in the implementation of a policy.
A recent example of this directive is the “Zero COVID Policy”. The Party gave directives to provinces to implement it and were informed that the aim was to keep the Covid-19 cases as close to zero as possible. However, the provinces had autonomy to interpret and implement the policy accordingly to their situation. That’s why the policy saw very strict implementation in places like Shanghai and slackening in other places like Liaoning and Hebei[v]. The ambiguity of the policy also helped Xi Jinping to avoid scrutiny after mass protests against it.
Another case for ambiguity in the domestic discourse is lack of critical debate in China. Despite rapidly modernising and developing in the last two decades, China remains a one-party Authoritarian State. The Party uses the ambiguity tactic to generate debate and deliberations among scholars and officials and this in turn gives the leadership an indication of what the public wants done. This is what the party calls “consultative democracy”[vi], where people are informally asked about their opinions on certain issues and policies (both domestic and international). Regarding consultative democracy Xi Jinping says that “Whenever a problem crops up, we should turn to deliberation first. Consultative democracy is an important mechanism through which the Party can lead the people in effectively governing the country and ensure that the people are the masters of the country”. Another form of consultative democracy in China is the “Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference” (CPPCC). The CPPCC is a central body consisting of people who have risen outside the party hierarchy like scientists, engineers, tech entrepreneurs, religious leaders, and authors. The body meets annually to discuss matters and propose legislations on matters of importance to the country.
Conclusion
During Mao’s time these phrases had devastating effects and were essentially a prelude to mass purges or incarceration. “Bombard the Headquarters” was a prelude to the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that led to turmoil in the country followed by mass persecution and deaths of “Thousands Class Enemies”. Over time these phrases have evolved into defining governance styles, policy measures and even to avoid scrutiny in case the policy fails. Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was about embracing capitalism without giving up the socialist credentials of the party; Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” was a socio-political theory that defined his vision for China; and Xi’s “Dual Circulation of Economy” is aimed at building self-sufficiency while remaining open to international trade until autarky is achieved. Thus, we learn that while these “phrases” were used as a tool for political campaigning, they have become an informal consultative process for introducing major policies.
[i] Bandurski, D. (2018, April 23). “The Arithmetic of Party”. Medium. https://medium.com/@cmphku/the-arithmetic-of-party-speak-c52debdd41db. Accessed on 12 February 2023.
[ii] 中共中央政治局常务委员会召开会议 习近平主持-新华网. 中共中央政治局常务委员会召开会议 习近平主持-新华网. (n.d.). http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-05/14/c_1125986000.htm. Accessed on 14 February 2023.
[iii] Bo Y. (7 April 2021). Rajagiri Management Journal, ISSN: 0972-9968. Accessed on 14 February 2023.
[iv] The 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China and Outline of Long-term Goals for 2035. (2021, March). National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Accessed on February 20, 2023, from https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/202103/P020210323538797779059.pdf
[v] Hao Zha, Yuxi Zhang, Hui Zhou, Lijun Wang, Zihan Zhang, Zijia Tan, Longmei Deng, Thomas Hale. (2022) “Chinese Provincial Government Responses to COVID-19”. Version 2. Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper. Available: www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/covidtracker. Accessed on 20 February 2023.
[vi] Xi Jinping (2022), “Xi Jinping on Consultative Democracy”, Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China. Available: http://en.moj.gov.cn/2022-03/03/c_721557.htm. Accessed on 18 April 2023.
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