It is truism that modern warfare is undergoing a rapid, fundamental transformation. The character of war has been increasingly characterized by the utilization and integration of technologies, resource management, optimization of assets, natural resources and the geopolitics of international political economy. There is also the blurring of lines between civilian and military spheres, hybrid and multi-domain character with a shift toward prolonged or rather short ones. In Gaza the collateral damage of over 60,000 civilians lost their lives in decimating Hamas! The Ukraine-Russia war has become protracted and has caused grave damage to infrastructure and very high civilian military casualties.
In the 21st Century it can be asserted that protracted wars have no victor or vanquished, highlighting that, the immense cost in lives, resources, and social fabric often leaves all parties worse off, effectively resulting in a “no-win” scenario. US and Allied Forces in Iraq and US in Afghanistan are cases in point. Even when one side achieves a military victory, the devastation (physical, economic, and psychological) can make the victory Pyrrhic—implying the losses outweigh the gains. Protracted wars invariably result in lasting scars, with issues like economic ruin, destroyed infrastructure, and lingering political instability, The last decade has indicated that even a superpower cannot achieve total win over the much smaller adversary, as the latter can bring into the arena of conflict enormous resilience due to the support of material and capacity to wage war by direct support of a conglomerate of nations without the they deploying their own military manpower to prolong the conflict indefinitely.
A war can also be limited where nations deliberately restrict their objectives, targets, weapons, or geographic scope to avoid total war. Unlike all-out conventional war, participants use only a fraction of their available resources, characterizing it by specificity, negotiations, or strategic/ operational goals. India’s Kargil War 1999 would fall in that bracket, limited in space and intent, and utilised short segment of warfighting wherewithal.
In all this cacophony of war-noise and activity has persisted purely bilateral conflicts between the states in South Asia, South East Asia and the Far East – some involving the use of military power, others in the zone of proxy wars and military coercion, flexing the show of military capabilities without firing a bullet or by attempting to isolate a nation state. These small wars can be exemplified by the recent one between Cambodia and Thailand, and even the US bombing of nuclear facilities in Iran using B2 bombers. In the latter case however, the 12-day bombing of Iran by Israel preceded the US action.
India has undertaken three offensive actions against Pakistan in one decade, that need to be rationalized. Each of these offensives were different as chalk and cheese, and yet had significant commonalties. These have been ill clubbed under what has been termed as Dynamic Response Strategy (DRS), which can be explained as flexible options from punitive cross-LC raids to precise cross-border fire assaults strikes. The larger aim was to impose severe costs largely on terror infrastructure and terrorists. Such a Strategy would not strain national economy and citizens, as also the global geopolitics. However, the term Dynamic Response Strategy is crafted from its original purpose as it appeared in 1992 after declassification by a Harvard Study group elucidating the original purpose. Hence It is essential to revisit the essential part of the report to understand how it evolved, why it evolved and hence cannot be put in a new format to achieve a strategy of what can essentially be termed as Non-Escalatory Warfare.
The first occurrence of the term Dynamic Response strategy was contained in a study report entitled “Dynamic Response: Military Strategy and Structure Into The 21st Century”. This was a declassified document of 128 pages made public on 25 June 1992. It was prepared immediately after the collapse of the former Soviet Union by Harvard University’s National Security Program. It was authored by a combined group of US Army, Navy and Airforce officers in 1991(Col Thomas L Allen, US Air Force and Capt R Kelly Gray, US Navy, assisted by three others). It is essential to quote the purpose of this research paper which was to:
“…to introduce a new national security strategy and military force structure for the 21st century. The Strategy called “Dynamic Response,” is based on defending clear and unequivocal national interests which are defined in the paper’s discussion of America’s “national security estate.” The authors contend that decisions on the size and shape of the US forces must rest on an enduring logic which is both clearly understood and endorsed by government institution and the public. Without this logic–provided by the Strategy of Dynamic Response– support for the military could erode, contributing to the gradual hollowing out of American forces and fostering an international environment that invites aggression. The proposed Strategy of Dynamic Response is placed firmly within the context of the evolving geopolitical landscape.
The paper examined four of the most significant post-Cold War forces that are fundamentally reshaping this landscape: the demise of ideology; the impact of the domestic economy on military power; the cartelization of geopolitical structures; and the acceleration of global socio-cultural change. To deal with these forces. a new national security strategy is required, grounded in the defense of the “national security estate.” This estate is made up of those regions of the world which are necessary to the survival of the US as a free and economically viable nation. These regions may encompass a wide array of political, social, economic and territorial resources, whose value with respect to US interests will evolve over time.
To defend the national security estate, US military forces must be capable of executing four competent strategies incorporated in Dynamic Response: Deterrence, Integrated Defense, Compellence and Reconstitution. These strategies can be executed by a US military force. as long as the effectiveness of this force is not diffused by trying to provide a security umbrella for peripheral concerns.
To deal with the uncertain, but enormously destructive threats of the post-Cold War world, Dynamic Response will employ a smaller and more flexible military force characterized by mobility and lethality. Assuming continued, verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenal of the Commonwealth of Independent States, such a force would incorporate a smaller and more affordable strategic nuclear component with a heightened emphasis on deterring and eventually defending against the use of nuclear weapons in non- traditional theatres of operation. On the conventional side, the strategy of Dynamic Response proposes a national force Structure consisting of a 450 ship US Navy, to include 10 carrier groups, an Army of 11 active and 8 reserve divisions, a Marine Corps with its three-division structure capped at 170,000 active duty personnel, and an Air Force of 15 active and 10 reserve tactical air wings and 900 airlift aircraft to protect American interests in the post-Cold War world. We project the cost of this structure to be approximately $240 billion in 1990 dollars. “
Therefore, the present attempt to rejuvenate Dynamic Response Strategy in a new avatar will suffer from non-acceptability by the strategic community world wide as the term has been coined earlier by the US based Study group which has a propriety right in terms of intellectual property rights. In the following paragraphs we have propounded the idea of Non-Escalatory Warfare projecting Indian Strategic thinking to reduce the possibility of protracted warfare.
The ‘surgical strikes’ of September 2016, were multiple shallow raids in POK by Indian Special Forces, with limited aims of targeting terror camps in proximity to the border. The Statement by the DGMO following the raids stated that “…during these counter terrorist operations, significant casualties have been caused to the terrorists and those who are trying to support them. The operations aimed at neutralizing the terrorists have since ceased. We do not have any plans for continuation of further operations.”
Consequent to the air strike against a terrorist camp of the JeM located in Balakot, Pakistan, the Foreign Secretary of India on 26 February 2019 stated that, “… this non-military pre-emptive action was specifically targeted at the JeM camp. The selection of the target was also conditioned by our desire to avoid civilian casualties.” The innovative term “non-military pre-emptive action” sought to elucidate that the target of the attacks was against camp of terror organisation, JEM, thereby pre-empting initiation of any larger armed conflict between India and Pakistan.
Lately, operations in Op Sindoor in May 2025, come under consideration, which was utilizing BVR kinetic attacks by missiles and drones across the IB and LOC, and artillery and small arms duals across the LOC between India and Pakistan. In the first briefing consequently, the Foreign Secretary clearly stated that, “…Our intention has not been to escalate matters…our response has been targeted, precise, controlled and measured. No military targets have been selected. Only terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan has been hit.”
It is apparent that India in exercising its right to respond and/or pre-empt as well as deter cross-border terrorist attacks, undertook offensive actions that were considered measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible in statecraft. The recurrent nature of these operations, latest being Op Sindoor, indicates the development of this strategic thinking, which can be called Non-escalatory Warfare. Non-escalatory warfare is its larger ambit need not be confined to military, and can include economic and diplomatic coercion. As the name suggests, that while undertaking strong military action, controlling escalation is a primary and the most important norm.
Such operations would have five distinct criteria. First, non-escalatory warfare refers to targeted, measured, precise and limited military actions. It is apparent that objectives are high-visibility, and high effect, and hence are clearly specific—such as dismantling terrorist infrastructure. However, while the quantum of punishment that such objectives would get high-visibility, it yet is restrained to avoid larger collateral damage. With expansion of thought-process, the objectives have to be strategic, the latest spread being from Bahawalpur to Muzaffarabad. It focuses on punishing perpetrators while avoiding civilian casualties or attacking conventional military facilities of the adversary.
Second, the initial operation is short duration, the completion of which clearly indicates termination of operation, which is formally conveyed to the adversary. Significant thread exists in 2016, 2019 and 2025, that the three operations –were all limited and hence non-escalatory. The short duration is relevant, to avoid triggering a continuum of a broader, full-scale conflict.
Third, consequent to the operation, the adversary is provided, formally and distinctly, a long rope to take a step back, and follow the epithet escalated only to deescalate.
Fourth is that a broad preparation for all-out conventional war is not indicated, which implies that a general mobilisation is not sounded. The intention herein is that general mobilisation at national level, may be construed as belligerence that would lead to escalation. Inherent in this is that in case escalation control is unsuccessful, and a broad conflagration is gets initiated, the planning for the same exists. Hence, non-escalatory warfare is part and parcel of the overall conventional war strategy.
Fifth is in the non-escalatory strategy, the nuclear equation does not get taxed, and the threats that adversary’s polity routinely make, get nullified. The global concerns of ‘nuclear overhang’ of South Asia are kept at the back-burner.
An important allied issue relates to decision-making at the Apex level, well prior to commencement of the operation. Contextually, pre-behavioural decision-making involves the cognitive, emotional, and evaluative processes that occur before an action is taken, focusing on how nations identify alternatives, set thresholds, and manage uncertainty. This stage includes evaluating options against international standards and managing cognitive biases that influence final choices.
Traditionally and rightly, political decisions that lead to strong military options, even if these are deemed non-escalatory, are centralized to a core group, hierarchical, and driven by national and intranational considerations. These also have to think through the adversary’s response options and the likelihood of escalation, methods of controlling escalation and the international ramifications. However, contemporary security threats, such as terrorism and cyber warfare necessitate a more multidimensional approach to decision-making. Policymakers in decision-making considering are also bound by a broader range of factors, including economic, social, and environmental dimensions, in their decision-making processes.
Pre-behavioural decision-making will provide setting a course of action—often an “if-this-then-what” plan—before encountering the situation that triggers a response. The pre phase focuses on evaluating options against a minimum threshold, utilizing cognitive, emotional, intelligence and social factors to identify, assess, and select alternatives. Pre-decisions, hence, on assuring non-escalation, and limiting escalation if it takes place, are strategies created to handle future scenarios, including goal setting and dealing with uncertain, high-pressure, or complex situations. Indeed, pre-behavioural decisions are greatly evaluative, but then can be speculative too! In sum, behavioural options must pass a minimum standard of non-escalation threshold before being considered for implementation, with often many options being discarded.
