On April 10 this year, Min Aung Hlaing, former Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services of Myanmar, took an oath as the civilian president of Myanmar. This move to give more legitimacy to the junta-led rule in Myanmar was not lost on the outside observers. This contentious attempt to gain legitimacy has far-reaching consequences for Myanmar and its neighbourhood.
For the military regime, the swearing-in is an attempt to provide new hope for peace in the war-torn country. During his inauguration speech, he stated that the country is on the way to democracy. He further announced a “100-day program” focused on democracy, economic recovery, and peacebuilding. This includes promises of loans to farmers, modernisation of the country’s infrastructure, and renewal of the peace process with the rebel groups.
As a result, Aung San Suu Kyi’s prison term was reduced, and she was moved from prison to house arrest. With these reforms, the Tatmadaw also aims to improve Myanmar’s international status, which has degraded since the coup in 2021. This directly impacted Myanmar’s economic well-being, regime stability, and its capability to fight the internal rebel groups, as sanctions and isolation made it difficult for the regime to address these issues. This article focuses on the changing political landscape in the country since the Presidential elections, the reactions of domestic and international actors to these developments, and analyses Aung Min Hlang’s attempt to reduce the country’s diplomatic isolation. Although promising in theory, this political reform faces significant challenges that limit its prospects for success.
Myanmar Since the Coup: Response of ASEAN and the International Community
Since February 2021, Myanmar has been in a state of turmoil. The military ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, claiming widespread electoral fraud in the November 2020 elections. Since then, the state has seen large-scale internal turmoil, global sanctions, and condemnation from multilateral groupings such as the United Nations and ASEAN. Internally, the dismantling of democratic institutions and detention of civilian leaders triggered nationwide protests and armed conflict.
The United States, the European Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom have imposed targeted sanctions against the junta regime post-military coup. These measures include freezing regime assets, restricting access to international aviation fuel, and cutting off revenue from state-owned enterprises.
The response of ASEAN states was different. One of the foundational doctrines of the organisation has been non-interference. As a result, unlike Western punitive measures, ASEAN adopted a more constructive approach aimed at changing the behaviour of Myanmar’s leaders through consensus. Post-coup in April 2021, then military leader Min Aung Hlaing agreed to a Five-Point Consensus. This framework was signed by the 10 ASEAN member states. According to this framework, the following five points were agreed upon by the ASEAN leaders: first, insistence on “immediate cessation of violence” and all the parties exercising maximum restraint; second, a call for constructive dialogue with all the concerned actors; third, ASEAN would appoint a special envoy who would monitor and mediate such dialogues; fourth had provision of humanitarian assistance and fifth said that ASEAN envoy should be allowed to visit the country and “meet all the parties”.
However, the progress on this front has been extremely sluggish as Myanmar reneged on most of the promises that it made to the ASEAN member states. As a result, since 2022, ASEAN has barred the military regime-appointed leaders from attending the ASEAN high-level summit. The bloc also decided to block Myanmar from “taking over the rotating leadership” of the regional bloc in 2026. However, Myanmar, on several occasions, has reminded the grouping of the principle of non-interference. Moreover, the grouping itself is divided over the issue, with states like Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos resisting stricter measures against the regime.
Plus Ça Change: New Elections, Old Power in Myanmar, and Limits of Managed Democracy
In the past few months, the Tatmadaw has been trying to project the country’s positive political developments to the international community. An indirect Presidential election was held in the country in April 2026. Both houses of the bicameral assembly and the Tatmadaw committee participated in the indirect elections. As a result, Min Aung Hlaing was elected as the civilian President with Nyo Saw and Nan Ni Ni Aye as Vice Presidents.
On the military front, the Tatmadaw is doing considerably better, as in recent months, they have overturned some territorial losses and started new military offensives. This includes a renewed focus on the important borderland towns and mineral-rich regions. Ye Win Oo, the new military head of the country, is leading this aggressive push in key strategic regions like Kachin and Chin. This push is aided by the thousands of newly acquired drones and conscripts.
On the diplomatic front, this also comes at a time when Myanmar is increasingly being isolated regionally and globally. These domestic political changes are a desperate attempt to break free from diplomatic isolation. In the recently held 48th ASEAN Summit, held in Cebu from 6th May to 8th May, these piecemeal reforms received mixed reactions. The grouping, as a collective, chided Myanmar for its failure to implement the Five-Point Consensus that was agreed upon in 2021. However, within ASEAN, the divide between the member states continues to widen as Thailand argued in the Summit in favour of letting Myanmar’s foreign minister into high-level regional meetings. Malaysia vehemently opposed this proposal. The continued impasse clearly reflects the fact that Myanmar’s piecemeal reforms have limited supporters in the region.
Western governments continue to push for the release of all the political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi. The European Union rejected the 2025 parliamentary elections as a “sham”. Similarly, they continue to consider the indirect Presidential elections as a bogus attempt by the military regime to avoid further sanctions against the regime. The EU also continues to support adherence to ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and calls for an end to violence against political dissidents.
The reaction of Myanmar’s political dissidents and rebel groups was that of open defiance. Khin Ohmar, head of Progressive Voice, argued post-elections that the new civilian government is “a junta in civilian clothing.” These piecemeal reforms, she argues, are an attempt to legitimise junta rule. The new President, after his election, also proposed that the rebel groups join peace talks within 100 days. That proposal was also immediately rejected by most rebel groups. Hence, most of the anti-junta rejected these elections and the proposals of the new civilian government.
Conclusion
The reactions of most of the actors point towards the limits of this new charm offensive. The Western powers, domestic anti-junta dissident groups, and ASEAN have either refused or are doubtful of such piecemeal reforms. The fact that all three of the indirectly elected leaders (President and two Vice Presidents) are connected to the military and the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party is not lost on outside observers. Myanmar’s political instability at its core is linked to the failure of the state to historically address the demands of non-Bamar minority groups. These piecemeal changes and renewed military offensives can only address this fundamental problem in a limited manner. Myanmar needs a long-term solution to its political problem, such as a more legitimate and representative government. Only that will end diplomatic isolation, accelerate economic growth, and end political instability.
