Introduction
The proposed 28th Constitutional Amendment is not merely a debate over constitutional reform in Pakistan. Rather, it reflects Islamabad’s continuing struggle to reconcile federal authority with demands for political representation from its peripheral territories. The unrest witnessed in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK) in June 2026 demonstrates that questions of autonomy, representation, and constitutional status remain unresolved. For India, these developments have implications that extend beyond the Kashmir dispute to regional stability, strategic competition, and Pakistan’s future political trajectory.
The controversy surrounding the proposed amendment has emerged at a time when Pakistan is grappling with economic difficulties, political polarisation, and growing discontent in several regions. While no final draft of the amendment has been officially released, media reports suggest that proposals under discussion include changes relating to provincial autonomy, local government empowerment, fiscal arrangements, electoral mechanisms, and even the possibility of creating new provinces. The proposals have generated significant opposition, particularly from political actors who fear that the amendment could dilute the gains of the landmark 18th Constitutional Amendment and strengthen federal control over provincial affairs.
Viewed in isolation, the debate appears to concern constitutional reform. However, when considered alongside developments in Gilgit-Baltistan and POJK, it reveals a broader contest over political authority, representation, and the relationship between Islamabad and Pakistan’s peripheral territories.
The 18th Amendment and the Debate over Federalism
The relevance of the 28th Amendment cannot be fully understood without revisiting the 18th Constitutional Amendment passed by parliament in 2010. It transferred significant authority from the federal government to the provinces.
Those who supported the 18th Amendment saw it as a corrective measure after years of over-centralisation at the expense of the provinces. Empowering the provinces was intended to help alleviate some of the regional issues that had created resentment and to create a more balanced federal system. Those opposed to the amendments felt that there was an overemphasis on decentralising governance. That would result in less effective policy implementation at both the federal and provincial levels. In addition, they believed that such a decentralised system would make it difficult for the federal government to react adequately to national problems.
In this respect, concerns have been especially evident in Sindh. The PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) leaders have expressed public disapproval of any constitutional arrangements that diminish provincial autonomy or upset present provincial balances. However, these concerns revive long-standing questions about how power should be distributed between Islamabad and Pakistan’s various regions.
Gilgit-Baltistan: A Strategic Territory without Constitutional Clarity
Few regions exemplify Pakistan’s federal conundrum as much as Gilgit-Baltistan does. Although Pakistan has administratively governed the area since 1947, the region is still outside the country’s official constitutional structure. Unlike Pakistan’s four constitutional provinces—Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—Gilgit-Baltistan remains outside Pakistan’s constitutional framework and lacks representation in the National Assembly and Senate. Historically, Pakistan has refused to make it a fully provincial unit due to possible effects on the position of the Kashmir Dispute. A paradox exists; the region central to Pakistan’s strategic interest will continue to exist without a constitutional definition.
Questions relating to constitutional recognition, political participation, taxation and resource distribution have repeatedly fuelled political mobilisation. Protesters in various districts took action against allegations of irregularities in voting, delay in announcing the results, and administrative interference in conducting the election. Election officials responded to claims of fraud and interference from Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and independent candidates, stating there was no wrongdoing. Regardless of whether or not the claims made are true, the dispute illustrated long-standing questions regarding representation and legitimacy of political governance in a territory where its constitutional status remains unresolved.
Pakistan’s current constitutional framework requires a two-thirds majority in each house of parliament for major constitutional changes. For example, opposition leaders commented that the events unfolding in Gilgit-Baltistan can be seen in conjunction with attempts to establish a consensus for broader constitutional reforms. These comments are contested and unsubstantiated at best. However, these comments do demonstrate how discussion over electoral legitimacy, representation and constitutional changes became interdependent in modern-day Pakistani politics.
In addition to the process of electing representatives, this event highlights many of the same issues discussed in recent debates about the proposed 28th Amendment, including representation, autonomy, and how power is distributed throughout a federation. Although the proposed amendment and Gilgit-Baltistan elections are based upon different political processes, both represent deeper tensions between the centre and the periphery. Thus, the controversy was not just an electoral dispute but was part of a larger discussion over how Pakistan governs its peripheral areas and accommodates competing demands for political inclusion. Due to its strategic value as a gateway into CPEC, these developments quickly gained national prominence.
POJK and the Politics of Representation
Similar concerns arose in Pakistan-Occupied Jammu & Kashmir. Deadly unrest erupted in June 2026 after the Pakistani government banned the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), an organisation that had gained momentum by organising protests against rising electricity costs, inflation, governance problems, and a poor economy.
One of the principal disputes concerned the allocation of parliamentary seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees residing in Pakistan. Critics argued that the arrangement diluted the political influence of residents living within POJK.However, ahead of the 2026 elections, the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir upheld the legality of the reserved refugee seats, ruling that they formed part of the constitutional framework governing the territory and could not be abolished through executive or judicial action alone. The JAAC has demanded the abolition of these reserved seats, arguing that they are used to undermine the authority of the elected government in POJK and enable Islamabad to maintain greater political influence over the region. The government’s decision to ban JAAC, together with subsequent clashes between protesters and security forces, further intensified tensions and brought questions of political participation to the forefront.
Protests challenged who was responsible for making authoritative decisions, how those decisions were made, and whether locals played a role in decisions being made about them. They show a trend of discontentment among citizens regarding representation and governance in the periphery of Pakistan.
The Common Thread: Pakistan’s Periphery Question
At first glance, the debate over the proposed 28th Amendment, the elections dispute in Gilgit-Baltistan and the JAAC mobilisation in POJK seem like three distinct events. They share one thing, though, as a representative group: representation and how political authority is distributed throughout the Pakistani State.
That is the basis for which the debate around the 28th Amendment is being contested. Advocates say that some sort of Constitutional Reform will help governance and increase Institutional Coordination. Critics think that changing federal Arrangements will only create more regional voicelessness or diminish current guarantees of Autonomy. Consequently, the Amendment Debate is now part of larger debates of Representation, Legitimacy and Political Inclusion.
Implications for India
For India, these developments are not simply internal Pakistani matters, as Pakistan conducted its first-ever polls in the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly. Before conducting this election, New Delhi registered a formal protest with Islamabad regarding Pakistan’s decision to hold elections in what India called the occupied Indian territory. The Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India reiterated that the entire Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh, including Gilgit-Baltistan, have been an integral and inalienable part of India since J&K acceded to India in 1947. The statement further argued that such electoral exercises could not conceal what it described as political repression, economic exploitation, and the denial of freedoms in territories under Pakistani control.
Firstly, if Islamabad decides to alter the constitutional status or governance structure of Gilgit-Baltistan, India can be expected to raise objections at the diplomatic level. As India regards Gilgit-Baltistan as illegally occupied by Pakistan, all efforts by Islamabad to integrate, reorganise administratively or amend the constitution of Gilgit-Baltistan will be seen as an attempt to change the status quo in the disputed territory.
Secondly, developments in Gilgit-Baltistan (and Pakistan-Occupied Jammu & Kashmir) are intertwined with CPEC. Since CPEC runs across territory which is claimed by India, changes in governance systems, constitutional status or federal systems have strategic importance. Hence, debate over the 28th Amendment assumes relevance both for Pakistan’s internal politics and for the governance of a region which has become a vital component of China’s signature connectivity project.
Thirdly, disturbances in Gilgit-Baltistan and POJK will have implications for regional security. Geographically, these areas form a unique junction where South Asia converges with Central Asia and western China. Instability, governance conflicts or enhanced security measures can contribute to deteriorating conditions in the broader regional strategic environment and thus to India’s own strategic considerations.
India challenges Pakistan’s administration of Gilgit-Baltistan and POJK based on legal and diplomatic issues; however, it does not possess sufficient leverage to affect developments politically inside these territories. Thus India’s principal interest in Gilgit-Baltistan and POJK is to monitor developmentally how the new constitution, emerging centre-periphery relationships and other governance developments in these territories may affect regional stability, CPEC and the overall strategic landscape of South Asia.
Conclusion
The debate surrounding Pakistan’s proposed 28th Constitutional Amendment is ultimately about more than constitutional reform. At its core, it reflects a broader challenge confronting the Pakistani state: how to balance central authority with demands for greater political representation, autonomy, and inclusion from its diverse regions and peripheral territories.
The future trajectory of the proposed 28th Amendment may serve as an important indicator of how Pakistan seeks to address these tensions. Whether the reform process strengthens federal cohesion or deepens existing grievances will depend largely on its ability to accommodate competing regional aspirations within a coherent constitutional framework.
For India, these developments warrant close attention. Changes in the governance and constitutional status of strategically important regions such as Gilgit-Baltistan and POJK have implications that extend beyond Pakistan’s domestic politics, touching upon the Kashmir dispute, CPEC, and the wider strategic landscape of South Asia.
