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Drones: Ideas & Inferences – Mind the Gap

Col. Samir SrivastavabyCol. Samir Srivastava
June 11, 2026
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Drones are the zeitgeist. It was coming for a long time but the recent (almost ongoing) war between USA-Israel and Iran has brought Drones into much sharper focus. The much-vaunted Super Carriers did not suffer the ignominy that Dreadnoughts did but quite a few quarters have already begun questioning their existence all due to puny flying objects – Drones.

In the Indian context, OP SINDOOR brought about a paradigm shift in how the Indian Army (IA) looks at Drones. It’s been a year since that epochal operation was launched & successfully executed. Having put in copious amounts of mindspace & money, now is the time that, IA needs to detach and ‘stress test’ various ideas with respect to Drones. Ideas by themselves are not bad; it’s wrong inferences that make them questionable. This article aims to assess some ideas and propose a ‘counter-idea’.

IDEA NO 1: ALL DRONES ARE THE SAME: ONE SIZE FITS ALL

To a layperson, Drones, all of them may seem to look like just one class but that’s not the case. Drones differ in payload, control mechanism, guidance mechanism and battlefield effects. A one size fits all approach will therefore not work and each entity/ arm needs to look at them from its own perspective. This will give each entity an idea of which type of Drones should worry/ interest them and thus tailormade solutions will be devised. The prevailing idea therefore should be that – Drones come in different configurations and a one size fits all approach will not work.

IDEA NO 2: DRONES ARE LIKE AIRCRAFT: TREAT THEM SIMILARLY

 The only similarity that Drones have with conventional aircraft is that they fly. Beyond that Drones are a new class of flying objects that unlike conventional aircraft are cheaper, simpler & ubiquitous. As stated above, Drones need to be treated differently across all fields which include envisaged battlefield effects, authorisation, procurement, training, logistics & repairs, battlefield management and most important – manning. At all levels, the following questions need to be answered: –

  • What are Drone deliverables on the Battlefield?
  • What are skills required to operate them?

Answering this will bring our specific battle requirements rather than a ‘handing Drones to everyone’ approach. First things first, what do conventional aircraft bring to the table? It boils down to three things: –

  • Long distances over which they operate.
    • High cost of each platform.
    • Lower numbers of aircraft & difficulty to replace them.

          The above make it imperative that there be a roboust airspace management system for conventional aircraft.  However, extending the same to Drones will rob them of their major advantage over conventional aircraft.       

Drones operate over relatively shorter distances, are relatively cheaper, in higher numbers and are much easier to replace & replenish. It is therefore imprudent to add a layer of ‘staff’ and ‘stuff’ to control Drones.

In the Indian context while conventional aircraft may be an ‘operational’ resource, Drones are a resource best utilised by Battalion Commanders; and to effectively employ them, the Battalion Commander should only look ahead (and up) and not behind.

The same logic also applies to repairs & recovery of Drones. There is no point having setup worth crores of Rupees catering to repair mostly minor Drones each costing at most a couple of lacs.

That said, even counter Drones, everywhere, is impractical. It is impossible to protect everything and this is the major takeaway from the recent Iran conflict. Now Speed is the New Stealth & Massing is Suicide; and this should guide counter Drones.

The prevailing idea therefore should be that- Drones are different from conventional aircraft and should not be treated like them.

IDEA NO 3: DRONES PRODUCE THE BEST BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS, ALWAYS

This is a half-truth at best. Gross battlefield effects are a function of two aspects – means employed and effects accrued. Means employed is in terms of all resources – material & human.  Assuming that material resources are a given, there is a requirement to analyse human resources. There is no point employing one / two personnel flying a Drone to knock out every random pillbox / foxhole / tank. Drones are best used like Special Forces; effect at one / two places, fear everywhere. IA needs to analyse and decide upon worthwhile battlefield effects – both operational and logistics. The prevailing idea therefore should be that – Drones are not the panacea for everything.

IDEA NO 4: A DRONE IS THE NEW PERSONAL WEAPON

Everyone today wants to be seen with Drones, be it Infantry, Armour, Artillery or even the Services.  That said, should Drones be the new personal weapon? The author feels that the answer is NO. During training at IMA, there, was an oft repeated quote that ‘Mountains Eat Troops’. Like mountains, even ‘Drones Eat Troops’.  Every single Drone requires one / two persons to operate and each Drone can be used for only one battlefield effect at a time. As brought out above, Drones alone cannot create all battlefield effects. The future battlefield requires a judicious mix of troops (with weapons), tanks, guns and of course, Drones. The prevailing idea therefore should be that- Drones still cannot replace the traditional soldier.

WHY AREN’T WE LOOKING AT DRONES DIFFERENTLY?

With all of the above stated issues there is also a requirement to analyse why Drones are not being looked at differently in spite of the need to do so. There is a possible reason for this.

The main reason in the author’s opinion is the mental orientation of the Army as far as equipment is concerned. At present, military hardware is procured with a three to four decades horizon.  This will not work with Drones.  IA needs to be ready for a situation where even brand-new Drones are obsolete. Therefore, old procurement mindsets will not work. IA does have a category of ‘Expendable Items’ ranging from stationary to hygiene chemicals and more – the touchstone being that those items are fast moving and cheap. While Drones are certainly ‘fast moving’ they are not cheap, though cheaper than conventional aircraft. This is where IA needs to take a leap of faith. Drones should be declared ‘Expendable Items’ with writing off powers delegated to Battalion / Brigade Commanders. This alone will make sure that IA procures enough Drones and trains on them. 

CONCLUSION

The last word on Drones is yet to be written. There will be a surfeit of ideas. Each needs to be evaluated and the best ones be advanced. This will happen over time and all entities of IA need to put their heads together and come up with the best idea(s).

Tags: DronesGapMilitary TechnologyPaperTheory
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