Geopolitical developments in the continent of Africa are mostly interpreted either as a form of renewed “Great Game” or as evidence of a “new scramble for Africa”. This framing provides us with robust analytical information about the growing strategic competition between the major powers such as the US, France, China and Russia on the continent. However, given the increased multipolar competition witnessed on the continent, the African states, now with expanded choices, are able to diversify partnerships based on sectors and national interest by practising strategic hedging. This article aims to analyse why this has become a possibility by shifting the unit of the analysis to African states and distil the significance.
Inevitability of Africa in Geopolitics
As per the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the continent accounts for about 30% of the world’s mineral reserves. Despite the fact that China might be the leading producer of global critical minerals, Africa has the largest critical mineral reserves. Similarly, the 2026 Africa Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook (MEO) report by the African Development Bank highlights that 12 of the 20 fastest-growing economies of the world are African. It is also projected that by 2050, for every four people on earth, one among them will be African and projected to have a positive demographic dividend. These are very few facts that emphasise the inevitable and the central role the continent occupies in geopolitics.
The Shift in Pendulum
The need to analyse the politics of choice of these African countries predominantly stems from the fact that it is understudied and under-analysed. Most literature captures the geopolitical picture from the perspective of an external actor continuing the traditions of Cold War and colonial analysis. But the African states now can access a wider range of trading and diplomatic partners, as it is not just major powers but also middle powers such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia who compete in the African theatre, thus emphasising the multipolar shift. This, in turn, increases their bargaining leverage and enables them to maximise their national interest, unlike the Cold War or the colonial days where their choices were constrained and limited. Thus, currently, a few African scholars claim that African states are practising the instrument of Strategic Hedging. While this explains the choice of the African states, the primary reason why the major powers do not completely disengage is explained by the rise in Africa’s strategic value and growing competition in the region. Recent developments across the continent explain these dynamics.
Strategic Choice in Practice
For Instance, the Lobito Corridor has been widely discussed as a geopolitical contest between Beijing and Washington. But Angola’s capacity to gain leverage in the geopolitical competition is the other aspect of this corridor. The Chinese Export-Import Bank funded the revival of the colonial Benguela Railway between 2006 and 2014, with a US$2 billion loan. This exact railway now plays a vital role in the expansion and development of the US led Lobito corridor project. The U. S. International Development Finance Cooperation (DFC) is said to claim this as Washington’s commitment towards developing an alternative mineral export route that can counterbalance China’s dominance in this arena. But it also shows Angola’s willingness to engage with both China and the US to avoid excessive dependence on any single actor even within the same sector.
Kenya, another major African state on the Eastern side of the continent, demonstrates how states leverage multiple partners to advance their national priorities. In March of 2026, Nairobi and Beijing signed the Early Harvest Arrangement under the Agreement on Economic Partnership for Shared Development. This grant expanded market access for Kenyan exports in China. Similarly, China also remains a central partner in major Kenyan infrastructure projects, which include the planned extension of the Standard Gauge Railway. Yet, within weeks, Kenya hosted the French President Emmanuel Macron during the Africa Forward Summit, where France announced €23 billion in investment commitments focused on agriculture, infrastructure, energy and artificial intelligence. This was a diplomatic win for Kenya as it was able to capitalise on the French pivot out of the francophone nations and concluded 11 agreements with France. Thus, Kenya’s simultaneous engagement shows a broader strategy as it is able to not just maximise its economic opportunities by diversifying partners, but also gain significant diplomatic soft power in the process.
Niger, on the other hand, illustrates how external partners sometimes are unable to withdraw completely from strategically significant nations. The fact that Niamey terminated its military arrangement with the United States, following the 2023 coup, led to the withdrawal of US troops and closure of a major American drone base from the country. However, this did not occur in a vacuum, as Niger simultaneously expanded its security cooperation with Russia. In May 2026, despite its initial reservations and protests, the U.S. donated military equipment worth about US$2.3 million to Niger’s armed forces, which includes medical supplies to support counterterrorism operations, protective gear and uniforms. Thus, the U.S. had to recalibrate its approach, instead of complete withdrawal, because of the strategic significance of Niger. This shows that competing multipolar powers actually increase the bargaining power of the African states, thereby increasing their agency.
The above discussion enables us to draw some major conclusions. First, the African States have gained significant agency to exercise their choices because of the wide range of opportunities and options in an increasingly multipolar world. Second, the inherent attempts by these African governments to move away from the colonial and Cold War alignment push them to proactively diversify their partnership. Third and most important, a closer look at the other side of the unit of analysis, i.e., the major powers, explains how most major powers try to work within a particular area where they have niche capabilities or established advantages. For example, China invests heavily in the minerals and infrastructure sectors, while Russia currently is expanding its security cooperation across the continent. France, on the other hand, is recalibrating its role from security provider to a historical partner with renewed investment diplomacy. The US, in the meantime, is recalibrating its policy towards investment in renewable energy, trade, technology, and democracy. However, despite all the agency and options, the African states inherently suffer from existing structural issues such as poor governance, instability, economic dependence and increasing climate change-related problems like desertification. Thus, by shifting the unit of analysis towards the African states, an alternative perspective is gained, which illustrates the changing nature of the continent and its agents. Viewing through this lens, enables us to understand that these African States are no more passive agents, but rather, active strategic actors who aim to maximise their national interest by exploring all choices available while strategically diversifying the partnerships to prevent over dependence.
