Introduction
Since 2017, Mozambique has been struggling with a violent insurgency spearheaded by the Islamic State-affiliated Ansar al-Sunna (also known locally as Al-Shabaab) group in the province of Cabo Delgado. Over a decade, the government of Mozambique has sought to counter the insurgency by engaging private military companies, such as the Wagner Group, and calling upon regional groupings, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), for military assistance. However, these efforts have found limited success as the violence has resurfaced in December 2025, adding, in a matter of days, another 1,00,000 people to the already displaced 1.3 million people since 2017. This article attempts to study the counter insurgency efforts of the Mozambican government and evaluate the shortcomings.
Origin of the insurgency
The Ansar al-Sunna insurgency is an Islamist extremist movement that originated in 2017 in Cabo Delgado province in Northern Mozambique. A combination of several factors gave way to Ansar al-Sunna’s rise in Cabo Delgado. Cabo Delgado province is severely underdeveloped. 76% of the province is rural, with the population primarily involved in agriculture. As of 2021-22, the average family income was below USD 1 a day, and almost 16% of the entire working-age population was unemployed. The standard of Living is extremely poor, with severe food insecurity and widespread malnutrition among children. Poor human development, lack of basic infrastructure, and severe food insecurity led to the radicalisation, which, in turn, was supplemented by a predominantly Muslim population. While only 18% of the Mozambican population follows Islam, Cabo Delgado is one of the only two Muslim-majority provinces in the country, with some districts containing 90% Muslim population.
Ansar al-Sunna first surfaced in October 2017, attacking several government buildings. Often dubbed as the ‘first Islamist attack in Mozambique’, the attack followed a series of terrorist operations by the group in the province, leading to a mass displacement. In 2018, the group, which was lesser known at the time, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and since then, has been known as ISIS-Mozambique. Since the advent of insurgency in 2017, the situation in the province has spiralled into a consistent cycle of violence, leaving thousands dead and over 1 million people displaced.
Counter-insurgency efforts
Initially, the Government of Mozambique downplayed the insurgency as a law-and-order problem. In 2019, the Government employed the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, along with the armed forces of Mozambique (FADM). However, by 2020, the Islamic State threat to national security began to look imminent when, in April, the insurgents executed 52 young people in Muidumbe district. As terrorists captured the villages and district headquarters, many natural gas companies operating in the province shut down their operations due to the lack of security. In April 2020, the government of Mozambique finally acknowledged that the country was facing “external aggression perpetrated by terrorists”. Following the failure of the Wagner group and their incoordination with FADM, the Government replaced it with the South African PMC, Dyck Advisory Group (DAG). However, DAG’s involvement could not produce results any more positive than the Wagner’s.
By 2021, the insurgents had successfully internationalised the situation by capturing the port town of Palma and halting the natural gas operations of the French energy company TotalEnergies. With Total Energies suspending its operations, this localised problem became a threat to the economy and stability of the entire region. In November 2021, Mozambique turned to the regional grouping, Southern African Development Community (SADC), for assistance in countering insurgency, an initiative that led to the deployment of SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), comprising troops from Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia, in Cabo Delgado. Additionally, Rwanda has deployed over 1,000 Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) troops in some districts of Cabo Delgado. Local militias formed against the insurgents have also been fighting along with the armed forces. The European Union has been training the Mozambican army, FADM, under the European Union Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) program.
Evaluation of counter-insurgency efforts
After finding limited success initially, the counter insurgency efforts began to show positive results. The deployment of SAMIM forces assisted FADM in liberating various towns from the insurgents. The deployment of RDF, although in only a few districts, turned out to be significant in countering Ansar al-Sunna fighters. However, the SADC mission ended in 2024 due to a lack of funding. Moreover, in 2025, international aid, especially from the United States of America, was halted, giving a significant setback to the counter insurgency efforts. Together, these factors led to a resurgence of violence in Cabo Delgado, culminating in the further displacement of 3,00,000 people in the second half of 2025.
The recent increase in attacks has only underscored the unpredictability of the insurgent violence. Despite the initial success of FADM, Rwandan, and SAMIM forces in liberating towns, villages, and natural gas reserves from Ansar al-Sunna’s grip, the insurgents were able to re-intensify violence in 2025 due to reduced international efforts and aid cuts, even pushing into the neighbouring provinces.
Recent External Factors
The government of Rwanda has threatened to withdraw the RDF from Cabo Delgado if the Mozambican government and natural gas companies such as TotalEnergies do not provide adequate funding for operations. The Rwandan comments should be seen in the backdrop of US sanctions over RDF for sponsoring the M23 group in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, if Rwandan troops are pulled out of Cabo Delgado, the situation may deteriorate rapidly as the RDF is central to counter insurgency operations.
Finally, the conflict in Iran has led to a spike in oil prices across the region, including Mozambique, a net fuel importer. Meanwhile, Mozambique also desperately needs International Monetary Fund (IMF) funding, which the IMF would provide in exchange for certain reforms, such as reducing public expenditure. However, the increased oil prices leave almost no room for the government to bring reforms, putting it in a tight spot, further endangering the counter insurgency efforts.
Conclusion
The counter-insurgency operations in Cabo Delgado have lagged at several fronts. Firstly, the government did not acknowledge the insurgent threat until it had become significantly high. The aforementioned delay enabled Ansar al-Sunna to strengthen its organisation on ground and capture cities. Secondly, the earlier CICT efforts were delegated to PMCs like Wagner and DAG, which could not produce any significant result due to various factors. Finally, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is a combination of security threats, economic distress and socio-political issues. However, the government of Mozambique has treated the insurgency as only a security problem, thereby moving forward with a military-led approach. Poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity have definitely exacerbated the situation by preparing a young, deprived population ready to be recruited by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State. The military operation in the province will have to be complemented with upliftment in the standard of life in the province, a parameter that is heavily dependent on the external aid given to the country.
