Introduction
A news article from Afghanistan International dated, 1st September 2026, reports that across all the southern provinces of Afghanistan currently only three female medical specialist remain. On the contrary, on 18th September, there was an attack at a mosque in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, and the responsibility was claimed by a faction of Pakistan Taliban. Meanwhile, another major happening that made headlines with respect to Afghanistan is the Saudi Delta International Energy Deal, despite the fact that it was not a deal between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, but Afghanistan and a private company. All the above events, define the complex and compelling state of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which makes it difficult for the policy makers of India to formulate a cohesive and unified policy. The article aims to analyse India’s policy towards the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan theoretically.
Realism would as a theory works on State survival and National Interest. Hence the moral component of any state practice is beyond the realm of decision making. Given, the well-established fact that with the Operation SINDOOR in May 2025; India has taken both kinetic and non-kinetic action against Pakistan. Similarly, in October 2025, after a heavy clash along the Durand line, both Pakistan and Taliban-led regime of Afghanistan closed the border crossing between two countries. Thus, 2025 was a catastrophic year for Pakistan as it was successful in antagonising its two neighbours and brought a two-front threat on itself. For any Waltzian – Mearsheimer policy maker in India, this could be the best outcome against Pakistan. Thus, India’s strategic engagement with the Taliban regime, can be best explained under this theory.
While the English School of International relations operate on the relationships among norms, legitimacy and recognition. The International Society as described by Hedley Bull, works on a simple principle; any state that wants to be part of this society shall follow the basic norms such as non-aggression and protecting the basic rights of its citizen. This, in turn, shall enable the state to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the International Society, which leads to recognition that is visible and formal. This is where the normative dilemma plays a vital role for any policy maker and state. In case of the Taliban-led Afghan government, the two most normative issue that makes Afghanistan an outlier are their policies with respect to human rights, women rights and terrorism. And this explains why, except Russia, no other country has formally recognised Afghanistan to extended full diplomatic relations. The Indian government’s act of not appointing an ambassador to Afghanistan, and not formally recognising the Taliban-led regime is in lines with how United Nations engages with the Taliban-led government as the “de facto authorities”, despite the fact that its legitimacy to represent the people of Afghanistan at UN is non decided. Afghanistan is still a member state of UN, but the indecision is about its legitimacy to represent its people which can be gained only if the member states of UN grants recognition by following the due process in the United Nations General Assembly. With respect to Indian governments act of upgrading the technical mission of India in Kabul to that of an Embassy on 21st October 2025 with immediate effect could be an outcome of a realist policy making rather than as an act to recognise or legitimate the Taliban-led government.
The engagement of institutions like UN, through UNAMA with the Taliban- led Afghan government, with focus on administering humanitarian aid and assistance can be explained under the theory of Liberal Institutionalism. It is because this theory focuses on the state’s ability to function along with other states on mutually beneficial issues. One important difference is that, while Liberal institutionalism focuses on how institutions are critical as they play a vital role in reducing the transactional cost incurred in the process of making these rules and its eventual enforcement and monitoring. Thus, unlike the English School of International Relations which focusses on legitimacy or recognition, the Liberal Institutionalism does not focus on these normative aspects. Hence, the engagement between Taliban-led regime and India via institutional mechanism such as the Moscow format consultation on Afghanistan, where India sits on the sample table as China and Pakistan to discuss on counter terrorism, regional security, political order, women’s security and anti-drug efforts is the classic example of how states can co operate with each other via institutions despite different national interest in the realm of state security.
Conclusion
India’s policy with respect to Afghanistan is one among the most pragmatic engagement that the policy makers have followed. It focusses on national interest as advanced by realist thought, while restraining legitimizing a regime with normative issues in the international society, but engaging with the same regime through institutional mechanism that shall be of low cost. This calibrated engagement is focussed on the India’s national interests and the strategic advantage of engaging with the Taliban-led regime. While the moral ambiguity of such engagement is questioned in various forums, it is answered via India’s act of withholding legitimacy and pressuring the Taliban-led regime to make calibrated steps towards adhering to the norms of the International Society to gain legitimacy. Thus, the current Indian policy towards Afghanistan is a coherent policy aimed to address its national interest, where restraint and cooperation act as the carrot and stick to serve the realist national interest of the Nation.
