The 18th BRICS Summit is just around the corner, marking a critical juncture for the grouping as it navigates the shifting global power dynamics. India holding the rotating chairmanship for the fourth time, is hosting the BRICS leaders’ Summit on 12-13 September 2026, at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi. The theme of the Summit Building (B) for Resilience (R), Innovation (I), Cooperation (C) and Sustainability (S), ” reflects India’s effort to give the grouping a more people- centric approach to development, with the principle of “Humanity First” at its core.
The two-day Summit brings together the 11 BRICS member countries and 10 partner countries to discuss key areas of cooperation, including political and security issues, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges. The discussions are expected to cover a wide range of global issues, including international terrorism, climate change, food and energy security, the digital economy, artificial intelligence and reform of global governance institutions.
BRICS in the Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
Two decades after its foundation, BRICS has emerged as an important platform for emerging economies from the Global South, and with the establishment of the New Development Bank being one of its most notable achievements. Its expansion has given the grouping greater economic and geopolitical weight in international politics, although internal differences among the member states continue to constrain its cohesion and effectiveness. BRICS now represents around 49.5% of the population, 40 per cent of GDP and 26 per cent of trade. It provides a platform for countries to discuss common concerns having regional and global significance while working towards the vision of a “ensuring peaceful, open and prosperous world”.
However, the growing importance of BRICS does not mean that all its members share the same geopolitical vision. In the present international environment, the grouping has particular relevance for the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle. Russia, India and China view BRICS differently according to their own national interests, economic requirements and international posture.
For Russia, the importance of BRICS has increased significantly since the Ukraine war and the imposition of Western sanctions. Restrictions on trade, investment and access to Western markets have pushed Moscow to strengthen its economic and diplomatic engagement with the Global South. Russia sees BRICS as an important part of the future global economy. The grouping provides Russia with a platform to engage with fast-growing economies, expand bilateral trade and investment, and remain economically connected, diplomatically influential and strategically relevant.
For China, BRICS represents a different opportunity. China is an economic and technological powerhouse and has adopted a more assertive position within the grouping. Beijing sees BRICS as a platform through which emerging economies can have a greater role in global governance. It also sees the grouping as a potential counterweight to Western-led institutions and the influence of the G7.
However, this does not necessarily mean that BRICS will become a formal alliance against the West. The interests of its members remain too diverse for such a transformation. This is where India’s role becomes important. India holds a central balancing position within BRICS. It maintains long-standing and friendly relations with Russia while simultaneously engaging with China through strategic dialogue and border diplomacy. At the same time, India continues to deepen its strategic partnerships with the United States and European countries. India’s approach of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment allows it to engage with different power centres without becoming part of bloc politics. Strategic hedging enables India to prioritise its national interests while avoiding direct confrontation between competing geopolitical blocs.
This balancing approach provides India with strategic flexibility. It allows New Delhi to cooperate with Russia on energy and defence, engage with China through BRICS and other multilateral platforms, and simultaneously strengthen its partnerships with the United States and Europe. This flexibility is also important for India as it pursues its long-term vision of becoming a developed nation by 2047.
De-dollarisation and Currency Cooperation
From a global perspective, BRICS is often viewed as an anti-Western model, particularly because of discussions around de-dollarisation and reducing dependence on the US dollar.
For some BRICS countries, particularly China are seeking de-dollarisation is increasingly connected with reducing their vulnerability to Western sanctions and limiting dependence on the dollar-dominated international financial system. In this sense, financial cooperation has also become a geopolitical issue.
However, India has adopted a much more calibrated approach. India does not support replacing the US dollar as the global reserve currency, nor does it support the creation of a common BRICS currency. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal has also made clear that India is not in favour of a BRICS currency. Instead, India has supported greater use of national currencies in bilateral trade and investment and the development of cross-border digital payment mechanisms.
This reflects India’s practical approach. India needs cooperation and partnership with the United States and the wider West, while at the same time it wants to expand economic engagement with BRICS countries.
India opposed “anti-dollar” project instead it proposed “expanding bilateral trade using national currencies including the rupee, yuan, rouble, dirham and Brazilian real” . This approach can help BRICS countries reduce dependence on the dollar in their bilateral transactions without directly challenging the dollar-based global financial system. Simultaneously, India is looking towards digital payment connectivity as a more practical way to facilitate trade. Linking fast-payment systems such as India’s UPI and Brazil’s Pix, along with exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, could make cross-border transactions faster, cheaper and more accessible.
In this context, India’s approach is not necessarily about replacing the dollar but about creating greater financial flexibility and reducing transaction barriers among BRICS countries.
Strategic Relevance of the 2026 Summit
The 2026 BRICS Summit is strategically significant for India–China relations as well. Chinese President Xi Jinping visit to India after seven years, creating an important opportunity for high-level bilateral engagement between the two countries which can help in resetting their relations making it stable . A bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi is expected before the Summit.
The visit is significant because India–China relations have faced serious tensions, particularly after the border crisis. Although differences between the two countries remain, continued diplomatic engagement is important for preventing competition from turning into permanent confrontation.
BRICS can provide an additional platform for both countries to cooperate on areas of common interest while managing their bilateral differences.
Challenges: Expansion vs Consolidation
Despite the growing importance of BRICS, the grouping faces major internal challenges. BRICS operates largely through consensus, and its rapid expansion has made coordination increasingly complicated. More countries from the Global South and East are interested in joining or strengthening their association with BRICS. Expansion increases the economic and geopolitical weight of the grouping, but it also brings countries with different political systems, economic interests and regional rivalries.
This creates an important debate: Should BRICS continue expanding, or should it first consolidate its existing membership and institutions? The differences between some of its members demonstrate the challenge. For example, Iran and the UAE are both part of BRICS but have had differences in their bilateral relations. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that contradictions among BRICS members can have a “negative impact” and make the drafting of summit “declarations more complicated”.
This shows that a larger BRICS is not automatically a more effective BRICS. If expansion continues without stronger coordination mechanisms, decision-making could become increasingly difficult. Therefore, the present moment may be a good time for BRICS to consolidate its institutional mechanisms before further expansion.
The Need for a BRICS Secretariat
The increasing diversity within BRICS also raises the question of whether the grouping needs a permanent secretariat or headquarters. At present, BRICS does not function like a traditional treaty-based international organisation with a permanent bureaucracy. Its chairmanship rotates among members, while coordination takes place through working groups, meetings and summit-level declarations.
This flexible structure has helped BRICS bring together countries with very different political and economic systems. However, as the grouping expands, the absence of a permanent institutional mechanism could become a challenge.
A permanent BRICS secretariat could coordinate between member states, maintain continuity between different presidencies and monitor the implementation of decisions. It could also help members work together on common concerns such as climate change, sustainable development, food and energy security, technology and development finance.
For India, this could also become an opportunity to demonstrate leadership in the institutional evolution of BRICS. The proposal of put “New Delhi at the centre of BRICS’ institutional machinery” or supporting such an institution could strengthen India’s engagement with different members and give greater continuity to the grouping’s work.
Conclusion
The 18th BRICS Summit comes at a time when global politics is becoming increasingly multipolar and competitive. For India, the Summit is both a challenge and an opportunity to balance its relations with Russia, China, the United States and Europe while preserving its strategic autonomy.
India views BRICS as a non-Western platform rather an anti-Western alliance. New Delhi’s focus is therefore on practical cooperation in areas such as trade, technology, energy security, digital payments and development finance, rather than bloc confrontation.
The success of India’s BRICS chairmanship should ultimately be judged by whether it can turn the grouping’s growing economic and political weight into meaningful cooperation.
