Introduction:
Post-independence period, India’s foreign policy was driven by the ideas of post-colonial identity, non-alignment, engaging in multiple relations, never compromising on strategic autonomy, solidarity with Afro-Asian nations, global disarmament, peaceful world through the establishment of global governance. These ideas are the result of India’s colonial past under the British. The opportunity of newfound freedom has given to shape its future actions.
The idealistic outlook underscored the importance of developing world countries with a comprehensive policy of the Non-alignment movement. It advised the “third world” to eschew engagement with either bloc while maintaining their autonomy and independent choice. India was not supportive of joining the international world order dominated by the U.S. and envisioned its world order based on its political and economic vision. Above all, it meant preserving India’s political and financial independence[i]. The non-alignment policy was initially implemented to express self-reliance.
But the declining economic performance and domestic constraints undermined India’s idealistic outlook and compromised its political project of promoting values of peace and non-violence.
Embracing the Western Model
The post-1990s period witnessed significant international development. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism resulted in the victory of the liberal world order. This manifested itself in many third-world countries adopting Western institution-led economic models to help navigate the problems of debt and poverty.
A series of ineffective governments dominated the early 1990s. Economically, politically, and strategically, India had lost its direction[ii]. P.V. Narsimha Rao assumed the office of Prime Ministership during this period. India’s high development trajectory and entry into the world of major power politics were the results of economic reforms implemented under his administration[iii].
Realising that for economic reforms to succeed, India would need the support of the West, especially the United States, Rao[iv] laid the foundation for the revival of US-India ties, acknowledging the importance of the U.S. in the world. The Indian economic crisis forced India to adopt the western economic model, while the historical wariness towards interdependence hampering sovereignty dissipated.
Nuclearisation of South Asia
In International politics, the existing clash between two poles finally came to an end, with the U.S. emerging as a preponderant power in the world without any rival. These structural changes exerted influence on other states in the system. Additionally, the Nuclearisation of South Asia and the potential rise of China were speculated to have an impact on Indian foreign policy based on a realist mindset[v]. But this assertion is simply a conjecture, where specific shifts in policy stance are implied as a change in the grand strategy of India.
With the nuclear tests conducted in 1998[vi], Vajpayee fulfilled his pledge to remove India from nuclear ambiguity after the Pokhran test in 1974. He then unilaterally agreed to two crucial stabilising measures: first, an informal prohibition on additional nuclear testing; and second, a commitment to No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons[vii].
India acquiring nuclear weapons does not mean it forgot the espoused Nehruvian consensus, but in contrast, this endeavour was the result of the strategic threat posed by China and Pakistan, and once the weapons were acquired, India continued on its vision of global disarmament and peace.
Some scholars feel that Indian foreign policy transformed in the post-Cold War with the nuclear tests done by India led by BJP in 1998. This party believes in martial and materially strong India. Scholars believe that India shredded away the policy of “restraint” and embarked on realistic behaviour by adopting the policy of “self-help”. These scholars believed a shift occurred in four key indicators.
M C Miller and K S D Estrada, in their paper Continuity and change in Indian grand strategy,[viii] highlighted those indicators. First, India is losing its moral aspects and prioritising national interests over them. Second, India is shifting from non-alignment to partial alignment based on realist interests. Third, with the changing structure of international politics, India is leaving the global south and embracing the strong global north and its security. Fourth, India is seeking admission into the international regime to enhance its status. These claims are some radical departure from the moralistic conceptions.
But given, the tendency of scholars to treat issues as binary (whether supporting or not specific ideas) bears essential consequences on the policy being judged. By and large, India did achieve some new directions while pursuing foreign policy, but it has not abandoned the deep core strategic values related to Nehruvian idealism. Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland[ix] prove this point by arguing that specific core strategic values are so deeply embedded in the mental architecture of India that it is difficult to abandon them.
Compared to the past, India is, indeed, a closer strategic partner of the U.S. Indian nuclear tests did prompt moral hazards with countries criticising India heavily for atomic tests. The tests were soon followed by a barrage of economic sanctions, but by 2001 U.S. administration eased most of the sanctions. This was followed by the US-India defence relationship inked in 2005 to enhance defence cooperation in maritime security and counterterrorism. This also allowed both countries to conduct naval exercises jointly.
The China factor in India-US relations
Structural changes with the rise of China and the U.S. fear that it could shift the balance of power in the former’s favour prompted it to support India to maintain the status quo. The most significant moment was when India and the U.S. signed the civil nuclear cooperation deal, which broke the three decades moratorium on nuclear energy trade between the U.S. and India. This deal raised India’s status, and New Delhi was accepted as a nuclear state by the international community. China’s growth and perceived aggressive intentions pushed India and the U.S. closer. In 2011, the Obama administration launched a “pivot to Asia” strategy that was a doctrine to rebalance Asia, where revisionist China is shifting the balance in its favour. This phase saw the bolstering of military ties between two countries with initiatives like strategic dialogue to further their interests. During Modi’s led government, India came closer to the U.S., but only in security terms, while disagreements in other areas like economy and immigration deepened. Common Chinese threats in the Indo-Pacific forced India and the U.S. to conclude the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) which allowed both countries to share their naval bases for berthing services. India’s closer ties with the U.S. are balanced by Modi’s visit to Wuhan in 2015 but without substantial agreements. India’s pride over strategic autonomy and to lessen the security dilemma prompted such foreign policy action.
Conclusion
A major factor that affects India’s close relations with the U.S. is China’s behaviour in the Indo-Pacific. If China’s behaviour becomes irredentist, then the U.S. and India will be forced to come closer to secure their interest, and the Post-Galwan accident proves this. Chinese aggressive intentions will prompt closer strategic relations between U.S. and India, but such ties will be short of formal alliance and more likely to be based on converging interests. Despite their differing response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the U.S. seems to be acting accommodative precisely because (although) the crisis may have grabbed attention, for the time being, U.S.’s biggest worry remains China making inroads in the Indo-Pacific. Presuming that India-US relations are purely based on democratic ideals would be short-sighted; rather, it is realpolitik that India supports U.S. on China. This behaviour is evident, given India’s reliance on Russia, from the unequal applications of values to Russia as opposed to China. Of course, while some degree of aspiration for strategic partnership is there, the want for regional support has more to do with India’s attempt to ward off border threats – China and Pakistan.
Endnotes
[i] Deepak Lal. ‘Indian Foriegn Policy’ JSTOR. Accessd on 10 September 2022. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4357933#metadata_info_tab_contents
[ii] Prashant P. Deshpande. ‘A critical review of foreign policy of India since 1947 till date’ Times of India. Accessed on 13 September 2022. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/truth-lies-and-politics/a-critical-review-of-foreign-policy-of-india-since-1947-till-date-part-i/
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ashley J. Tellis. ‘Nuclear Transitions and Strategic Stability in Southern Asia’ Carnegie. Accessed on 10 September 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/18/nuclear-transitions-and-strategic-stability-in-southern-asia-pub-87399
[vi]Security Council Condemns Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan. UN. Accessed on 12 September 2022.https://press.un.org/en/1998/sc6528.doc.htm
[vii] Abhijnan Rej. ‘The foreign policy legacy of Atal Bihari Vajpayee’. Live Mint. Accessed on 07 September 2022. https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/kZI9uaKnH41oM9d7HJdfZO/The-foreign-policy-legacy-of-Atal-Bihari-Vajpayee.html
[viii] M. C. Miller and K S Estrada. ‘Continuity and change in Indian grand strategy’. Accessed on 08 September 2022. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:86c0b555-9e05-4c30-90e2-25742c050f2e/download_file?safe_filename=20171127FinalizedContinuity.pdf&file_format=application%2Fpdf&type_of_work=Journal+article
[ix] Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland. ‘Democratic Accountability and Foreign Security Policy: Theory and Evidence from India’. Accessed on 15 September 2022.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1416818
