Introduction
Since 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been experiencing significant external and internal turmoil. The crisis began with the twelve-day bombing campaign by Israel and the USA in July 2025. It was followed by a mass unrest in major cities, and a loss of an estimated 3,000–30,000 lives in brutal suppression by the Iranian regime in January 2026. Finally, in March 2026, the USA launched Operation Epic Fury, a coordinated multi-domain warfare campaign. It officially concluded in May, leaving Iran economically vulnerable and increasing the possibility of further protests and unrest. Although the Islamic Republic has experienced wars and internal instability before, it has rarely looked as vulnerable as it does currently. Meanwhile, Iran is home to a diverse ethnic and religious composition. The largest and central area of Iran, often called the Persian Heartland, is home to Persians. The western part is inhabited by the Kurdish community, the north-western by Azeri Turks, the south-western by Iranian Arabs, the south-eastern by the Baloch community, and finally, the North-eastern by Turkmens. Over the years, some of these identities have grown ethno-nationalist aspirations. The regime in Iran, and before it the Shah, had managed to maintain a strong central control over the periphery. However, in a post-war scenario, if a weak centre emerges in Iran, the nationalist aspiration in some of its ethnic communities can very well turn into a security problem, especially if they are exploited as proxies by Iran’s adversaries.
Ethno-nationalist aspirations of the Baloch and Kurdish communities
The four million-strong Baloch community mainly resides in the south-eastern province of Sistan-Balochistan on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Baloch people speak Balochi and Brahui and mostly follow Sunni Islam, in contrast with the Shia state of Iran. The people of Balochistan remain among the poorest in Iran, often lacking basic infrastructure, facing poor governance, and erasure of identity at the hands of the Iranian Government. Often, this political oppression and poverty have resulted in violent clashes between protestors and regime forces, such as the Zahedan protests in September-October 2022, which witnessed the deaths of around 100 Baloch people as a result of the government crackdown. Moreover, the presence of a cross-border national aspiration of a Baloch nation, comprising areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan too, adds fuel to the ethno-nationalism. Baloch insurgent groups like Jaish-al-Adl have established themselves, taking advantage of the cross-border links to the Baloch groups on the Pakistani side of the border. This prompted Iran to conduct cross-border airstrikes inside Pakistan in January 2024. Although Iran has long accused Israel, the USA, and even, to some extent, Pakistan of utilising Baloch militants for “terrorism” in Iran, Israel’s role in supporting insurgent groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Pakistan has been widely reported in the Pakistani media. Evidently, the Free Baloch Movement (FBM) has appreciated the US-Israeli attacks against the Iranian regime. In case of a weak post-war central government emerging in Tehran, the possibility of Iranian Baloch insurgents carrying out BLA-style operations inside Iran will become stronger. A similar surge in insurgency was witnessed after the twelve-day war in 2025, when Jaish-al-Adl brought together smaller Baloch opposition groups and declared the creation of a People’s Resistance Front (PRF) against the Islamic Republic. If the post-war government fails to control the periphery, the sporadic Baloch insurgency may turn into a cross-border movement, coordinating with outside powers and the Baloch groups in Pakistan.
Being the largest minority, Iranian Kurds constitute around 10% of the Iranian population and reside in the western and north-western parts of the country. As opposed to the larger Shia theocracy of Iran, Kurds are followers of Sunni Islam. Like the Baloch community, Kurds have also been victims of political and cultural oppression both by the current Islamic Republic and the previous Shah’s government. In 2014, the Iranian regime banned the Kurdish language as a medium of education and publications. Kurdish names for children were also forbidden. The political and police oppression against Iranian Kurds has become a permanent grievance for the community. The most prominent instance occurred in the 2022 anti-Hijab protests or the Women, Life, Freedom movement, following the custodial death of a young Kurdish woman named Mahsa Amini.
Much like the Baloch community, Iranian Kurds are also inspired by cross-border solidarity and the aspiration of the Kurdish nation, called Kurdistan, which also comprises territories from neighbouring Turkiye, Iraq, and Syria. Kurdish groups have a history of being important allies to the USA against the Assad Government in Syria and ISIS in Iraq. Although Iranian Kurds have not allied with the United States as heavily as their Iraqi and Syrian counterparts and have mostly remained pro-Iranian unity. An estimated 5,000-8,000 Iranian Kurds have been training with Iraqi Kurds in Erbil since the beginning of the war. Since 2019, relations between the Kurds and the USA have deteriorated from being indispensable allies to partners marked by deep mistrust. However, in a scenario where the Iranian regime is unable to maintain tight control over its Kurdish provinces, the USA and the influential Kurdish groups from Iraq, Turkiye, and Syria may utilise this opportunity to create a proxy presence in Iran through Iranian Kurds.
Conclusion
Although the government in Iran has, in the past, attempted to build infrastructure and improve governance in peripheral areas such as Sistan-Balochistan, Western Azerbaijan, and Kurdistan, it has found only limited success due to mismanagement of resources and corruption. Moreover, with a few exceptions, neither the Shah nor the Islamic Republic has co-opted the ethnic minorities, like Kurds, into the power structure of Iran. The erasure of identity and state-led oppression further exacerbate their grievances. The Islamic regime has also actively prevented any credible political opposition from organising in the country, thereby removing the option of a proper grievance redressal mechanism. At present, a strong central control has prevented these ethno-national identities from turning into full-fledged insurgencies. However, a weak post-war government with a weaker grip over the periphery would present ample opportunity to adversaries to create a proxy presence inside Iran.
