On October 21, 2024, the Indian Foreign Secretary announced a significant breakthrough in India-China relations: a new agreement on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This development comes after years of tension and diplomatic exchanges following the deadly Galwan clashes of 2020, where soldiers on both sides lost their lives in a bloody confrontation. The border standoffs that followed, particularly at Galwan, Pangong Tso, Hot Springs, Gogra, Demchok, and Depsang, saw both countries engage in sustained diplomatic and military dialogues. While some standoffs were resolved by 2021, others, notably in Demchok and Depsang, lingered. Against this backdrop, the recent agreement raises a few pertinent questions: Why is it happening now? Can the India-China relationship return to its previous levels of trust? And, perhaps most importantly, what should be the endgame at the LAC?
The Agreement
While the official details have not been revealed, reports in the media suggest that the following arrangements have been reached:
- Patrolling will be done in areas as it was done before 2020.
- Patrolling to resume in Depsang from PP10-PP13.
- Patrolling to be done twice a month with no more than 15 personnel to avoid the possibility of clashes.
- Patrolling will be coordinated by both sides.
- Once a month meeting between the commanders of both sides.
Timing of the Agreement: Strategic Considerations
The timing of the agreement offers several clues as to why China has decided to pursue a deal now. Several factors likely played a role in Beijing’s strategic calculations.
First, China is likely preparing for a possible return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2025. Trump’s tough-on-China policies, from imposing tariffs on Chinese goods to launching a broader trade war, were among the most disruptive foreign policy actions during his tenure. His rhetoric and policies had created friction not only between Washington and Beijing but also pushed China to rethink its global alliances. If Trump returns to the White House, there is every reason to believe that he will continue to adopt a hardline stance on China, which could result in even more pressure on Beijing. In this scenario, China is likely keen to stabilize its regional relationships, especially with a country as crucial as India, which has grown closer to the United States in the last decade.
Second, China’s economic challenges are becoming increasingly severe. Over the past year, the Chinese economy has shown signs of flailing, with its real estate market collapsing under the weight of unsustainable debt, its export numbers shrinking, and its domestic consumption stagnating. China, once the global manufacturing hub, now finds itself grappling with excess capacity in many industries and struggling to generate sufficient domestic demand to sustain growth. In this context, access to large and growing markets like India’s becomes even more important for Beijing. India, with its rapidly expanding middle class and significant consumer base, offers a lifeline for China as it seeks to revitalize its economy.
Third, China recognizes the growing geopolitical and strategic weight of India on the global stage. Since the Galwan clashes, India has adopted a more assertive stance in its foreign policy, drawing closer to the United States through initiatives like the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) while also strengthening ties with other key regional players like Japan and Australia. India’s increasing participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy, along with its closer defense ties with the U.S., likely compels Beijing to seek stability on its western border. By agreeing to the recent LAC patrolling arrangements, China might be attempting to prevent further escalation of tensions with India, which could push New Delhi into even deeper strategic cooperation with Washington and its allies.
Restoring Trust: Can India and China Find Common Ground?
While the new agreement marks a step towards managing tensions at the LAC, the deeper issue of trust between India and China remains unresolved. The trust deficit between the two nations has grown significantly since 2020. For decades, the two countries had managed their border disputes through diplomatic channels and confidence-building measures (CBMs), even as their armies stood face-to-face at the LAC. However, the Galwan clashes were a turning point, shattering the fragile trust that had existed and pushing India to reevaluate its relationship with China.
Following Galwan, India took a firm stance, linking the resolution of the border issue to the broader framework of bilateral relations. This was a sharp departure from China’s preference to treat the border dispute as separate from other aspects of the relationship, such as trade and diplomatic engagement. China, for its part, consistently sought to de-link the border issue from its broader ties with India, seeing economic cooperation and diplomatic engagement as areas that could move forward even if the border issue remained unresolved. However, India refused to accept this decoupling, and its hardline stance has resulted in a strategic recalibration on Beijing’s part.
The trust deficit is further compounded by the fact that both nations are expanding their influence in the same geopolitical space. As India grows more active in its role in the Indo-Pacific and strengthens its defense and economic ties with the United States, it comes into direct strategic competition with China. This competition manifests not just at the border but also in the diplomatic arena, where both countries vie for influence over smaller nations in South Asia and beyond.
In this context, the analogy of “one scabbard cannot hold two swords” is fitting. Both India and China are rising powers with ambitions that increasingly overlap. The idea that the two can grow together in the same strategic space is unrealistic. Instead, the relationship will likely remain competitive, with cooperation in some areas (such as trade) and confrontation in others (such as regional influence and border issues). Trust between India and China is unlikely to return to pre-2020 levels, as both nations have fundamentally different visions for their role in the region.
The Endgame at the LAC: Delimitation and Demarcation
While the recent agreement on patrolling arrangements is a positive step, it is not a long-term solution to the border dispute. The LAC remains an ambiguous and undefined boundary, with both countries holding competing territorial claims in critical areas such as Depsang and Demchok. This ambiguity has been a major factor in the recurring tensions along the LAC, as both sides patrol areas that they believe fall within their respective territories, leading to clashes.
The endgame at the LAC must be the delimitation and demarcation of the boundary. Delimitation refers to the process of defining the boundary on a map, while demarcation refers to physically marking the boundary on the ground. Without delimitation and demarcation, the risk of future clashes remains high, as the lack of clarity over the boundary will continue to fuel tensions.
Historically, China has been reluctant to engage in delimitation and demarcation efforts, preferring instead to maintain a level of ambiguity along the LAC. This allows Beijing to assert its claims without committing to a fixed boundary. However, for India, the lack of a clearly defined boundary is a source of insecurity, as it allows China to incrementally expand its presence in disputed areas through a strategy often referred to as “salami slicing.” This involves making small, incremental gains that cumulatively alter the status quo in China’s favor.
For India, delimitation and demarcation would provide much-needed clarity and security. It would establish a clear boundary that both sides would have to respect, reducing the risk of future confrontations. However, achieving this will be a complex and difficult process, as it would require both countries to make concessions on their territorial claims. Given the deep-rooted nature of the dispute and the nationalistic sentiments attached to these territories, such concessions will be hard to come by.
Nevertheless, the recent agreement suggests that both sides recognize the need to manage tensions at the LAC. While delimitation and demarcation may not happen in the immediate future, the fact that both countries are willing to engage in dialogue and reach agreements on patrolling arrangements is a positive sign. In the interim an immediate step in the right direction would be the fixing of disputed areas to obviate any fresh disputes manifesting in the future.
Confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as the disengagement of troops in certain areas, have already helped to de-escalate tensions, and these efforts should continue alongside more comprehensive talks on the boundary issue.
Conclusion: A Tactical Reset, Not a Strategic Shift
The recent agreement on LAC patrolling arrangements is a significant development in India-China relations, but it should be seen as a tactical reset rather than a strategic shift. China’s motivations for reaching this agreement are likely driven by a combination of factors, including its economic challenges, the potential return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, and India’s growing geopolitical importance. However, the fundamental issues of trust and strategic competition between India and China remain unresolved.
India and China are unlikely to return to their previous levels of trust, as both nations have increasingly divergent visions for their role in the region. The border dispute at the LAC is just one manifestation of the broader strategic rivalry between the two countries. The endgame at the LAC should be delimitation and demarcation, as this would provide a long-term solution to the boundary dispute. However, achieving this will require sustained diplomatic efforts and, most importantly, political will on both sides.
In the short term, managing tensions through agreements like the recent LAC deal is crucial for maintaining regional stability. But in the long term, a more comprehensive resolution to the boundary dispute will be necessary to prevent future confrontations and build a more stable relationship between India and China.
