The recent naval drill between Sri Lanka and Pakistan held between late March and early April has stirred up tensions and speculations over the very nature of the drill. The naval exercise involving the Pakistani vessel, PNS Aslat, a F-22P Zulfiquar-class guided missile frigate, was reportedly conducted off the coast of Trincomalee in northeast Sri Lanka (Nawaiwaqt, 2025). Although the probable cancellation of the drill made news in Indian media, an official announcement or remark on the matter was never officially made. Instead, Pakistan quickly accused India of meddling out of its typical paranoia. However, these claims were “formally denied” on April 19, 2025, by both Sri Lankan and Pakistani authorities, stating that the drill was pre-approved and completed without any disruption (International Defence Analysis, 2025).
Col Nalin Herath, the spokesperson for the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry, established that the vessel “arrived at the port of Trincomalee, engaged in scheduled joint exercises and departed subsequently”. The Pakistani High Commission in Sri Lanka refuted the cancellation, backed by the Defence Advisor Col Muhammad Farooq, emphasising that the request for a port call for one of their vessels was ‘duly approved’ by the Sri Lankan authorities (Ibid, 2025). Yet, the lack of public disclosure about the date, specifics, timeline, objectives, and even the drill’s name has invited some scrutiny.
This speculation was fuelled when Former Navy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, raised concerns over India’s potential involvement in Sri Lanka’s military bilateral engagements in the context of the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation. He further questioned India’s influence behind the confusion and demanded that the National People’s Power (NPP) government owed the citizens an explanation over the Indian claims of shelving the drill (Shamindra Ferdinando, 2025).
India is concerned not so much about the exercise’s secrecy as about greater strategic penetration in its own neighbourhood, particularly by China and its close buddy Pakistan. Despite Pakistan’s lack of official investment or interest in Trincomalee, its recent presence on the region’s military map cannot be disregarded. In light of this, India’s response to the Sri Lanka-Pakistan drill, whether brief or covert, must be interpreted as part of a growing sense of strategic unease.
PM Modi’s Visit and Present Tensions
India, to strengthen its ties with Sri Lanka, has increased its investments in key sectors such as solar and energy infrastructure development. During PM Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka, a major tripartite agreement was signed between India, the United Arab Emirates and Sri Lanka’s Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) to make Trincomalee an “energy hub” and boost the island nation’s energy security as well as economic growth (Rushali Saha, 2025). This trilateral agreement constitutes a part of India’s broader security approach.
A significant step was taken by signing a Defence Cooperation Agreement —a five-year pact and the first major defence agreement between both countries (Press Trust of India, 2025). Under the existing defence cooperation, India now trains approximately 750 Sri Lankan defence personnel each year, further improving military-to-military interactions (Ibid, 2025).
This Indo-Lankan partnership was reassured by President Dissanayake’s commitment that “Sri Lanka will not allow its territory to be used in any manner that could threaten India’s security interests” (Anubhav Maurya, 2025). The President’s expression of India’s unwavering support and commitment during times of economic and humanitarian need reiterated growing trust between the two countries.
India has also strengthened its strategic presence by ‘revitalising’ the Trincomalee oil tank farm, boosting its energy security and regional standing in IOR. The deal, signed in 2024, grants India the right to lease 14 of the farm’s 99 tanks for 50 years (Economy Next, 2025). The project is one of several measures by India to guarantee energy supplies and counter China’s plan to build a USD 4.5 billion petroleum refinery in Hambantota port. The development of such renewable energy and interconnection projects, such as the bidirectional ‘undersea electricity cable’ connecting Chennai in India to Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka, will strengthen this energy reliance (India News Network, 2024).
These actions represent more than just maritime cooperation; they represent an intentional alignment that can potentially jeopardise India’s influence in the Indian Ocean. India, recognising this new phenomenon, has increased its involvement with Sri Lanka, not only through defence MoU but also through common security interests. One must read Modi’s trip to Colombo and the important agreements he signed as India’s proactive reaction to this subtle but robust signalling.
Efforts to Combat Maritime Narcotics
India’s engagement with Sri Lanka has intensified against maritime narcotics trafficking, particularly with increased Pakistani narcotic activity in the IOR. Given their geographical location in the Indian Ocean, a major hub for global maritime commerce, the two countries face significant obstacles in developing their Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The vast number of commercial fishing vessels within international waters, along with the sophisticated monitoring operations, makes it rather challenging to detect and identify prospective threats. Moreover, maritime criminal activities such as drug trafficking and piracy pose serious threats to the economic stability and security of the region.
In 2024, the two nations carried out a joint major anti-narcotics operations in collaboration with the Indian Coast Guard (ICG), the Sri Lankan Navy, the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS), and the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). These operations have been critical in combating the growing issue of narcotics trafficking in the Indian Ocean.
On April 28, 2024, Indian officials intercepted a big drug trafficking effort off the coast of Porbandar, making it one of the largest operations. The operation was linked to Pakistani drug agent Haji Aslam, alias Babu Balock, who arranged for the transfer of illegal narcotics using a boat called Alraza, which sailed from Karachi. The vessel attempted to transport massive amounts of heroin and methamphetamine to Sri Lanka-based handlers via an intermediary ship from Tamil Nadu (Indian Express, 2024).
The operation took place on the night of April 25-26, off the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL). Based on intelligence and in coordination, the Indian Coast Guard and Navy quickly intercepted the consignment and found large quantities of narcotics. The 14-member crew, all Pakistani nationals from Lasbela in Balochistan, were arrested. This interception accounted for one of the ‘biggest narcotics and psychotropic substance hauls in recent history’, highlighting the ongoing menace posed by Pakistani drug trafficking operations (Ibid, 2024).
Earlier that year 2024, another joint operation was successful between India and Sri Lanka. On November 24-25, Indian Naval Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Remotely Piloted Aircraft, based on Sri Lankan Navy intelligence, intercepted two vessels operating in the Arabian Sea. The operation resulted in the seizure of about 500 kg of narcotics, mainly Crystal Meth. Both vessels and their crews were taken into custody by Sri Lankan authorities for further legal proceedings (BharatShakti, 2024).
These efforts demonstrate Sri Lanka and India’s knotted and ongoing cooperation in the battle against narcotics trafficking, particularly the problems posed by Pakistani drug syndicates. The significance of increasing MDA in protecting the region is emphasised by the fact that both nations, along with regional and international partners, continue to collaborate through institutions like the Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
Conclusion
The alleged cancellation and limited transparency from Pakistan and Sri Lanka indicate larger strategic issues. India views the growing maritime cooperation between Pakistan and Sri Lanka, especially in a sensitive area like Trincomalee, as a matter of concern.
As regional dynamics shift and partnerships evolve in the IOR, the Trincomalee naval drill is far from any joint exercise— it comes as a sign of rising challenge to India, where we must now act swiftly to strengthen its backyard before others do.
