Professional knowledge and competence are the sine qua non of leadership.
Field Marshal S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, 11 November 1998
Introduction
The test of a military network is not how it performs when connectivity is assured. It is whether the force can keep fighting when that connectivity disappears.
Modern operations depend on digital links. Commanders draw on many sensors, and headquarters track friendly movement and stocks in near real time. This connectivity has shortened the interval between detection, decision and action.
It has also created a target. An adversary need not destroy a formation to disrupt it. Interrupting the flow of information may be enough. Electronic warfare, cyber operations, attacks on infrastructure and interference with satellite services can all degrade command at a critical moment. The effect may be local, intermittent or prolonged. A formation may keep some channels while losing its operational picture, its digital reporting or contact with higher headquarters.
For the Indian Army the concern is practical. A conflict with a technologically capable adversary will be contested in the electromagnetic spectrum, often over mountainous terrain where distance and limited infrastructure already strain communications. This article argues that network disruption should be treated as a foreseeable battlefield condition, and that a formation’s ability to fight through it should be measured as part of combat readiness. The question is simple. Can a formation continue to fight effectively in the first hour after its network goes dark?
The vulnerability behind digital dependence
Digital networks have improved the speed and quality of decisions. They have also encouraged an expectation of continuous connectivity. The danger lies less in the failed link than in the slow loss of shared understanding.
Four risks follow. A commander may act on stale information, because a display can look current long after its data has aged. Subordinates may wait for orders that cannot arrive, which is costly when the situation is moving fast. Adjacent formations and supporting elements, once synchronised through a common network, may drift apart. And a headquarters may spend its attention restoring connectivity when it should be conducting the battle.
Publicly reported Indian exercises show that the Army recognises the problem. In July 2022, Exercise Skylight tested the Army’s satellite communication network, including protocols for switching entirely to satellite communication in a conflict. The same report says it exposed key lacunae in the systems, without saying what they were. In March 2025, a defence spokesperson said that Exercise Prachand Prahaar in Arunachal Pradesh was conducted in an electronically contested environment. The public accounts say little about how command behaviour was assessed when the links failed.
What the first hour demands
The first hour is the period in which operational continuity is either kept or lost. Stale pictures, hesitation and the pull of restoration all peak before anyone has understood what has happened, and it is then that delegated authority either holds or does not. The initial task is to establish whether the disruption is local or widespread, whether it is likely to persist, and which command functions remain. Restoring connectivity cannot become the only priority. Operations must continue within the information available and the authority already delegated.
This rests on preserved intent. Subordinate commanders must know the purpose of the operation, the higher commander’s priorities and the limits within which they may use initiative. Mission command has to be an operating habit that was practised before the outage, backed by trust and by realistic training. A formation that decentralises decisions only in routine exercises will struggle to do so under pressure. Critics will say that decentralisation invites divergent action. It can, which is why intent must be paired with decision thresholds agreed in advance. Unmanaged hesitation is usually the greater danger.
It also rests on managing uncertainty. Information that arrives through alternative channels may be late or incomplete. Commanders and staffs must separate confirmed reports from unverified ones, and state the age of the information they are using.
A framework for disconnected operations
The US Army treats this as a normal condition. FM 3-0 (2022), in its chapter on leadership during operations, tells units to plan for intermittent connectivity and to train staffs in analogue and manual command procedures, including a non-digital common operational picture and manual staff estimates. The manual also provides for succession. If a commander cannot act because of jamming or the loss of a command post, the senior commander who can still communicate takes over. The lesson for the Indian Army is to treat loss of connectivity as a routine training condition, not an exceptional contingency.
The first hour needs a standard against which it can be judged. The Disconnected Operations Readiness Framework proposed here assesses four dimensions through observation, not equipment inspection.
- Command continuity. Do subordinates understand intent, delegated decisions and acceptable risk well enough to act without further orders, and does everyone know who takes command if the commander cannot act? Measure: time to the first decision taken within delegated authority.
- Information continuity. Can the formation keep local records and a usable picture by manual and alternative means, and tell current information from stale? Measure: time to produce a manual situation update that states the age of its information.
- Coordination. Do adjacent and supporting elements know how essential information will move? Measure: whether a fire support or movement task completes through the fallback arrangement.
- Decision-making. Can the staff track resources and support the commander without automated systems? Measure: whether the commander receives a validated estimate in time to decide.
Each dimension is scored in a controlled exercise in which the network is cut without warning for a period set by the exercise authority, starting with one hour. The result is a measure of disconnected endurance: how long essential command functions continue at an acceptable standard. Commanders can then compare formations, track improvement and set minimum standards. The most revealing serial is not a clean cut. It is a network that appears to work while its data freezes or degrades. Partial degradation is more dangerous than total loss, because it preserves trust in a display that has stopped telling the truth. Formations should be scored on how quickly they detect it.
The joint dimension
This is not a problem the Army can solve alone. Land operations rely on air support, aviation and air defence, and each is coordinated largely through digital links. If the loss of a common network ends that coordination, the force has been connected, not integrated.
Several arrangements should therefore be agreed before an operation and rehearsed jointly. Fallback procedures should cover requests for air support and aviation tasks. Pre-planned fire and airspace coordination measures should default to a safe condition when links fail, so that a missing message does not become a risk to friendly aircraft or troops. Liaison officers at key headquarters should know the fallback channels and the authority they carry. Air defence units need clear engagement rules for the moment they lose contact with their controlling agency. Any such rule trades the risk of fratricide against the risk of leakage. That trade should be made deliberately, in peacetime, because it cannot be made calmly in the middle of the outage.
Making readiness measurable
Five measures would turn the argument into practice.
- Institutionalise cut-off serials. Command post, field and joint exercises should include an unannounced loss of selected networks, with commanders assessed against the four dimensions.
- Issue a degraded-mode procedure for every formation. It should name the essential functions, the alternate reporting arrangements, the responsibilities and the minimum information needed for a decision.
- Strengthen mission orders. Orders should state purpose, priorities, constraints and decision authority, so that fewer decisions depend on clarification from above.
- Test manual skills. Staff officers should be periodically tested on operational records, situation updates and resource accounting without automated support.
- Set resilience as a capability requirement. Procurement should ask whether systems work with intermittent connectivity, retain essential local data and pass priority messages by alternative means.
Disconnected endurance should then be reported alongside other readiness indicators.
Conclusion
The future battlefield will be digitally connected, but it is unlikely to stay connected all the time. An adversary able to contest the spectrum will attack the information flows on which operations rest.
Equipment will help. It will not be enough. Commanders must be ready to use initiative. Staffs and formations must be able to work and coordinate without their normal architecture. The first hour after the network goes dark tests preparation done long before it. A formation’s ability to fight through that hour should be measured, reported and treated as a component of combat readiness.
References
- Manekshaw, S. H. F. J. (1998). Making a Leader. Lecture at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington (edited extract).
- ThePrint. (2022, August 5). Amid India-China tensions, Army conducts Exercise Skylight to test satellite-based systems.
- The Tribune. (2025, March 27). Army conducts tri-service multi-domain exercise in high-altitude area.
U.S. Department of the Army. (2022). FM 3-0, Operations, paragraphs 8-23 to 8-26.












