Introduction

Since the Revolution of 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has meticulously created and managed a string of proxy groups in the region on the pretext of spreading the “Islamic revolution”. These proxies are often known as the Shia Crescent or the Axis of Resistance. These include Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Front (PMF) in Iraq, and Houthis in Yemen, and remain at the forefront of Iran’s regional influence projection. Similarly, Iran’s Government maintains close ties with certain governments in the region. Unlike the proxy groups, these government-to-government ties are not necessarily based on ideological or religious convergences. A few prominent examples would be the Assad regime of Syria and the Armenian Government, neither of which was a Shia theocracy like Iran. However, now Iran faces competition from Türkiye, another actor that has been increasing its influence in the region, more often than not at Iran’s expense.

Iran’s Insecurity About Increasing Türkish Influence in The South Caucasus

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Azerbaijan’s declaration of independence in 1991, Tehran expected cordial relations with the newly found country. Historically, Azerbaijan had been under the territorial sovereignty of the Persian Empire. Azeri Türks constitute around 16% of the total population of Iran, making up one of the largest minorities along with Kurds. Moreover, besides a few differences, Azeris follow Shia Islam and have supported the government in Tehran. Despite these similarities, the newly independent nation of Azerbaijan tilted towards Türkiye, a neighbouring country that shared its ethnic and linguistic heritage. Moreover, since its independence, the Türkiye-backed Azerbaijani government has maintained strategic relations with Israel, proving to be a key Israeli ally in the region. Besides, Azerbaijan has occasionally provided separatist Iranian Azeris and anti-Iran demonstrators with a platform. All these factors combined have contributed to Iranian insecurities about Azeri ethnic separatism, prompting Iran to quietly cultivate relations with Azerbaijan’s neighbour, Armenia.

Iran’s sense of insecurity over rising Türkish-Azerbaijani influence has been exacerbated due to the Second Armenia-Azerbaijan War of 2020. In 2020, conflict erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the long-contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in a 44-day war that

ended with Azerbaijan gaining partial control over the region. The war demonstrated the use of Türkish-supplied weapons, including Bayraktar drones, by the Azerbaijani forces against an Iranian ally very close to the Iranian border, further adding to Iranian insecurity. Moreover, Armenia’s government has signalled stepping out of Russia’s shadow and mending relations with Türkiye and the West. Although Azerbaijan has steered clear of creating any Azeri ethno-separatism in Iran, the dynamic may change now that Iran has just suffered devastating setbacks in the recent conflict. In case of a weak Iranian centre emerging from the current conflict, Türkish and Azerbaijani influence in the Azeri majority north-western region of Iran will be an issue of insecurity for Tehran.

Iran’s Loss of An Ally in The Coup D’état in Syria

The Iranian regime had long maintained strategic ties with the erstwhile Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, sending financial and military assistance against the Islamic State (ISIL) and other militias in the Syrian Civil War. From 2012, Syria had been mired in a civil war with several militia groups fighting each other for territorial control. Among these, some of the most prominent ones were Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of Al Qaeda and backed by Türkiye; the Free Syrian Army, backed by Türkiye and the USA; ISIL, a breakaway group of Al Qaeda; and Syrian Democratic Forces, a militia of mostly Kurdish soldiers backed by the USA. Meanwhile, Iran and its proxy group, Hezbollah, backed Bashar al-Assad’s government.

When ISIL lost ground in 2019, the conflict spiralled into a stagnant deadlock between the Assad government forces and other militias like HTS. Ultimately, in December 2024, Türkiye-backed HTS, headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, ousted the Assad government, capturing Damascus in a swift campaign. The fall of the Assad government at the hands of a Türkiye-backed militia, which follows Sunni Islamist ideology and has publicly accused Iran of creating instability in the region, is a cause of increased insecurity. Besides, US President Donald Trump has recently suggested supporting the Syrian forces in attacking Hezbollah positions in Iran. Although Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa has rejected the idea, arguing that the Syrian government will prioritise reconstruction and development before attacking Lebanon, the possibility of a pro-USA government turning hostile will not be lost on the Iranian regime.

Conclusion

Since its inception, Iran has clearly outlined that it sees Israel as a security threat to its regional interests. Although there had been no direct conflict between the two countries before June 2025, Iranian proxies like Hezbollah have carried out several offensives against Israel. Meanwhile, Tehran has, at multiple times, accused Israel of conducting cyberattacks and propagating violent riots in Iran. However, Türkiye, not Israel, has caused much degradation in Iran’s allied regimes in the region, weakening Iran’s regional position as a result. Although such regime degradation has been immensely beneficial for Israel, it has not been directly involved in them, except for the offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

On the other hand, the relationship between Türkiye and Iran has remained cooperative and lukewarm over the years. Both countries have also found convergence in issues like Israel’s offensive in Gaza and the West Bank, support for Hamas, and suppression of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement. Despite the like-minded approach to some issues, Türkiye’s NATO credentials, along with increasing influence in the region at Iran’s expense, ought to increase Iran’s insecurity. Although there have been several speculations calling Türkiye the next “Iran” for Israel, arguing that Türkiye can be the next “Israel” for Iran will also not be far from the mark.