Originally published at : https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/pakistan-army-pasni-port-and-a-sell-out-to-america-101760804807953.html
It makes little strategic and commercial sense for Washington to invest in a project in Balochistan. For the US president, the numbers just don’t add up
The new strategic gossip around the block, and there’s plenty of it when it comes to Pakistan, is the reported offer of the port of Pasni to the US to build it up as a route to secure critical minerals. A report in The Financial Times does, however, say this idea is yet to be pitched officially to the White House, but is being discussed with businessmen, a route that Pakistan army chief Asim Munir has used successfully in getting US President Donald Trump’s attention.
All of this needs a little disaggregating to make sense of a deal that Pakistani officials are now trying to backtrack on, in an effort to appease China. As a war threatens on the Afghan border despite the current tenuous ceasefire, and the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a far-right populist political party, rampages across major cities, Pakistan’s desperation for a little handholding is intense.
The apparent reason for offering the port and developing it at a reported cost of some $1.2 billion through federal and US-backed funds is for shipping out critical minerals. That deal, signed between US Strategic Metals (USSM) and Pakistan’s army-run Frontier Works Organization (FWO), is worth just $500 million, an amount that an earlier dictator, General Ziaul Haq, would have called peanuts, especially since it would entail Pakistan spending at least half of the total estimated costs of 3.8 billion Pakistani rupees.
It’s doubtful if Pakistan can afford to pay even half that figure. Nor presumably would a commercial enterprise want to pay up for something worth a quarter of that. But there are other aspects at work.
First, the USSM director has been quoted as saying that he had heard of Pasni and spoken to port officials from Karachi and Gwadar. His company also wants to set up a refinery in Pakistan.
There is a raft of research indicating that refining of rare earths constitutes a major health hazard; therefore, placing it in most countries would be difficult. Protecting the environment, however, is a non-existent priority for Pakistan, especially in Balochistan.
Second, he also indicated that the port made sense since it was also close to the Reko Dik copper and gold mine, run by Barrick Gold Corporation, which holds majority shares. The mine is situated equidistant from Karachi and Gwadar harbour. Presumably, the latter was always meant for trade, even as the port languishes with fewer than seven ships docking in a year.
The truth is that Pakistan has never been able to get around to building infrastructure like roads and railways to optimise the port. It is only now that there is a tentative agreement for a project to revive this that is backed by multiple funders, in the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
In other words, even China is hanging back. And, it’s not just China. Saudi Arabia quietly abandoned talk of funding the Barrick mine.
Now it seems Barrick is looking for $3.5 billion from the US and G-7 countries. So while a massive vein of gold and copper does seem to exist, foreign companies are reluctant. True, there’s a persistent insurgency, but no one from these or other companies has ever been targeted. Hardly surprising, then, that the Pakistanis have turned to the US. The thing is, any US-funded rail line will certainly help the Chinese as well.
The other side of the picture is this. Recently, a study by the National Institute of Maritime Affairs, the official think tank of the Pakistan Navy, has assessed that in the event of another war, the Indian Navy would target all major ports, including Pasni.
Bringing the US in — only for commercial purposes, according to available information — would protect Pasni at least, and perhaps Gwadar. This assessment would be aimed at getting funds away from the super-rich army, but it has a point. Unverified reports claimed that Pakistan had shifted most of its F-16s to Pasni, fearing an Indian attack just before Operation Sindoor.
The critical question is how a possible US entry would affect India’s stance in a possible future war. A factor often forgotten in New Delhi’s reaction to the 26/11 Mumbai attack was that US forces were present in major ports, including Karachi, in a logistics trail to Afghanistan, even as US military aircraft flew the skies. That proved to be a limiting factor at that time. However, the US presence in Pasni would hardly curtail Indian actions this time.
For one, it’s too far away from operational areas, barring naval action. As for the second possibility of a US base at Pasni, consider the extreme US hesitation in giving Delhi certain military equipment due to the presence of the Russian S-400 missile system. Washington would hardly like to expose its own fighters and air defence to eager Chinese eyes, given that about 80% of Pakistan’s inventory is of Chinese origin. A certain US undercover presence is a given. But that’s also something that India has lived with for decades.
The final factor is whether America will see the project as profitable, given that the Trump administration is in transactional mode. It already has around 10 bases in West Asia, far more insulated from trouble.
The raging Baloch insurgency in Pakistan has notched up another attack on the Jaffar Express just recently, and any railway projects are likely to prove a tempting target, even while the Americans themselves would be exempt. The Balochs have never targeted foreigners, not even the hundreds of Chinese involved in projects in their state.
The lure of gold is considerable, as are critical minerals. But Pakistan’s first shipment was veiled in mystery, which brings in the second factor — the understandable rage among politicians at this secret selling of Pakistan’s resources. Add to this, electricity for the Makran area comes from Iran, a sworn enemy of the US.
In sum, building up Pasni and its infrastructure makes little commercial or strategic sense. For a transactional president, the numbers just don’t add up. They look even worse now, and as the Afghanistan border war heats up to reach even Balochistan, close to the reputed mines, those numbers are only likely to slip into the negative.
