Introduction
For the past four years, a full-scale civil war has wreaked havoc in Sudan. The Under-Secretary General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, in her November 2024 briefing to the United Nations Security Council, warned about the impact of continuous weapon supply to both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Group and how it would only ‘enable slaughter’ and prolong the conflict. Despite these early warnings, the situation in Sudan only worsened. For instance, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan in early 2026 concluded that crimes committed in and around El Fasher bear “the defining characteristics of genocide.” The situation on the ground has only deteriorated further with drones entering the war zone. The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs had to urge the external actors once again in her June 2026 briefing to the UNSC to stop providing the fighting sides with sophisticated weaponry and to use their influence to end the civil war. This clearly shows that despite repeated attempts by the United Nations to draw attention to the conflict and numerous mediation initiatives, the conflict has only become more complicated and intense. This raises a fundamental question: why has the conflict in Sudan become persistent?
Competing Explanations
Existing literature analysing this question uses multiple explanatory lenses, but to arrive at a cohesive understanding of this complex and interlinked conflict, it is essential not to neglect any of them. This article in particular attempts to compile these explanations and provide a holistic understanding of one of Africa’s most complex conflicts.
Since independence, Sudan has not yet completed its state-building process, and this has been constantly contested and remains incomplete. Instead of consolidating governance institutions to begin with, the governments in charge struggled with regional inequalities, the concentration of power with elites, and military intervention, leading to coups. Under Omar al-Bashir’s regime, governance relied primarily on tribal alliances, patronage networks, Islamist sharia ideology, and, most importantly, a dependence on parallel security institutions. Thus, when Sudan plunged into civil war in 2023, it wasn’t an isolated event but an outcome of long-term political failures in building civilian governance institutions.
Following the ousting of Bashir in 2019, which finally led to the creation of a joint civil-military government, this was once again overthrown by a military coup in 2021. The agents of this military coup are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the army of Sudan, and the Rapid Support Forces, a powerful paramilitary group and parallel security institution traced to the Janjaweed militia. Thus, in 2023, one immediate cause of the conflict was the disagreement between Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who was the transitional president after the 2021 coup and the head of SAF, and Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the deputy president and the leader of RSF, with respect to the integration of RSF into the country’s mainstream security apparatus. Thus, the coexistence of two powerful forces with the legitimisation to use force led to the disintegration of the security institutional framework of the country and eventually transformed political disagreements into military conflict.
This is exactly where another factor, resources, that is, the immense gold trade of Sudan and thus the control over its mines, needs to be analysed. This is because the gold did not essentially start the war, but it has enabled RSF to sustain the war. Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti”, was granted mining and trade access by Omar Hassan al-Bashir in return for loyal service after RSF was formally recognised in 2013. Further, in 2018, Hemedti’s family company Algunade was able to sell gold to external markets, even bypassing the central bank. As mentioned, the external actors who are allegedly involved in this trade with RSF are Dubai and Russia. A CNN investigation in 2022 reported that Russia has established close connections with RSF and that Moscow provides political and military support in return for gold. Thus, as the war began in 2023, RSF became far less dependent on the Sudanese state’s finances and now has alternate revenue streams to sustain its military operations.
Beyond gold, the Strategic location of Sudan with access to the Red Sea, Proximity to the Horn of Africa, and the internal political disputes of the volatile Sahel region transformed the Civil Conflict into a theatre of competing national interests. UAE has repeatedly denied any support to RSF; however, given the established trade network with the Algunade company, the UAE has been repeatedly accused by UN experts of providing military assistance to RSF via Chad. In fact, Sudan instituted proceedings against the UAE at the International Court of Justice, but the UAE delayed any involvement in the conflict. Countries like Egypt, Iran and Türkiye predominantly align with SAF. Egypt backs SAF as a result of long-standing military ties and, most importantly, to ensure the security of the Nile. Iran and Türkiye view Sudan as a key ally to ensure the security of the Red Sea region; hence, both nations are reported to have assisted SAF with drones such as Mohajer-6, Ababil-series, and Bayraktar TB2 by Iran and Türkiye, respectively. Neighbouring states such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Libya are also involved in this conflict to secure their National Interest in the Sahel region. For example, Ethiopia supports RSF as a result of spillover of its conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, who in turn are allies of SAF. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam adds another complex layer to the crisis and explains why Ethiopia supports RSF and Egypt supports SAF. The United States has emphasised diplomacy and peace negotiations. It has also sanctioned many RSF leaders who are accused of human rights violations.
Now, when we try to shift focus from external agents to within Sudan, it is slowly moving beyond conflict between SAF and RSF. This is because, despite the RSF controlling huge areas of Darfur and the SAF controlling the rest, state governance functions like tolls and taxes are now being handled by “mini-state” like entities of local leaders and groups. Similarly, another important factor to be acknowledged is the militarisation of tribal identities and its spillover in the region. Political activist Khaled Nour claims that as military recruitments are now focusing on tribal identities, which was witnessed in the recent uptick in military camps in Eritrea. Thus, it leads to further complications within the existing regional dynamics, spillover, and, most importantly, delays the peace negotiations, as these negotiations can no longer be limited to SAF or RSF.
Conclusion
The above analysis explains the multiple complex layers and agents involved in the Sudan Civil War, thereby capturing a holistic picture. The reason this conflict has prolonged over four years is beyond the two warring security agencies and various geopolitical actors involved. The weak civilian institutions inherited from colonial rule enabled the concentration of power within the elite classes. This, in turn, was worsened when the legitimacy to use force moved beyond civilian control and became concentrated not just with the Sudanese Armed Forces but also paramilitary forces. This, when coupled with the overreliance on a resource-based economy, only led to further inequalities within the Sudanese society, hence making both tribal and religious identities vulnerable to politicisation and militarisation. All these have reinforced each other, thus preventing the State from becoming a cohesive and legitimate unit of Governance and Force. This enables external actors to profit from the inherent issues of the region as a whole. Hence, the conflict persists because the institutions essential to broker peace are inherently weak and thus are unable to retain peace in the region.
