Introduction
Whenever bilateral ties between India and China are examined, a pattern often tends to emerge. Reports about China’s attempts to rename some unknown mountain or river in Arunachal Pradesh, appear frequently. The Chinese government refers to Arunachal Pradesh as Zangnan, which translates to South Tibet in Mandarin. It is not only a linguistic difference but also a reflection of the ongoing territorial contestation. Beijing claims that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Chinese territory, whereas India rejects the term Zangnan by arguing that it has been an integral part of India long before it officially became an Indian state in 1987. The consistent rejection of these claims by India, and their treatment as routine administrative measures by Beijing, has created a recurring cycle.
This article explores how these repetitive and deliberate claims by China are connected to the concept of San Zhong Zhanfa or the Three Warfares Strategy. It was adopted by the Central Military Commission in 2003 when it revisited Political Work Regulations of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This strategic framework brings together legal warfare, psychological warfare and media or public opinion warfare as alternatives to direct military coercion. It resembles Sun Tzu’s idea of “winning without fighting”, operationalised through Grey Zone Warfare.
Legal Warfare Through Cartography and Naming
The most obvious example of the territorial dispute in the form of strategy is the list of place names. Since 2017, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs has been releasing standardized names of the locations situated in Arunachal Pradesh regularly. Six places were renamed in 2017, fifteen in 2021, eleven in 2023, thirty in 2024, twenty-seven in 2025 and twenty-three in April 2026. Officially, the Chinese government has named several geographical features, such as mountains, rivers, passes, villages, etc., in Mandarin. Each location has also been provided with its unique Tibetan script, pinyin transliteration, accurate coordinates and maps.
What can be noticed while tracking the timing is the fact that hardly any release has happened randomly. The first list was released right after Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang. Then the 2021 batch was followed by the Tawang area clashes. In 2024, the list had fallen upon the inauguration ceremony of Sela Tunnel (which significantly increases the speed of troop mobilisation towards Tawang). Finally, the 2026 list appeared at a period of diplomatic de-escalation between India and China. This fact speaks for itself because warming of ties did not stop this exercise. Although, it did put some pressure on the process.
It is combined with the 2023 standard map controversy wherein China’s Ministry of Natural Resources published a national map of the country where the territory of Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin were marked as Chinese territory. India lodged a formal protest against it as being baseless. Malaysia and the Philippines also joined due to their own maritime disputes with China. This strategy is referred as “Salami Slicing”. China has employed the same strategy in the South China Sea, where the original Nine-Dash Line was expanded with the addition of a Ten-Dash Line in its 2023 standard map. However, this does not change anything on the ground which anyway is not the Chinese goal. The goal is to repeat the exercise decade after decade in order to include it into discussions of the territorial disputes by neutral observers.
Psychological and Media Warfare Through Normalisation
Renaming exercises and map releases derive their psychological value from repetition rather than immediate impact. By issuing lists of standardised names, Beijing seeks to create a sense of continuity and inevitability, by manipulating the audiences to view its territorial claims as a recurring reality instead of isolated events. The message is aimed at shaping the psychology of both decision makers and the wider public, thereby sustaining psychological pressure without direct military coercion. The pattern becomes more evident when major developments take place in Arunachal Pradesh, often followed by another round of renaming exercises.
There is also another layer of it targeting the international community, namely the countries which consider the importance of Indian territorial claims in their joint statements or visits. Whenever foreign officials, including Dalai Lama, pay their visit to Arunachal, Beijing’s reaction includes protesting and releasing another round of renaming exercise soon. However, despite all these efforts, no major Western government has changed its stance. In 2023, the U.S. Senate introduced a bipartisan resolution confirming that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India which condemned China’s renaming exercises and any other attempts to change the status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The media warfare serves as a tool for connecting all the pieces together. Each renaming list and each map release is covered by the Chinese state outlets and amplified by official statements from the Foreign Ministry which use the same vocabulary: routine, lawful and sovereign exercises. The consistent use of Zangnan by Chinese state media outlets such as Xinhua, People’s Daily, Global Times etc. reflects a deliberate propaganda strategy aimed at institutionalising Beijing’s preferred territorial narrative.
The idea is that the constant official emphasis on Zangnan will seep into how other countries and institutions refer to the region gradually. The whole thing is also a part of a wider linguistic strategy as well, namely the normalisation of the term Xizang (Tibet) in place of the older romanisation. Once one term gains wide international acceptance, then framing the Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet will be considered as a natural extension of it.
Implications for India
The Indian reaction to this strategy has been very consistent till now. It has included fast rejections of each list by the Ministry of External Affairs and affirmations that the names are fictitious, baseless and propaganda exercises. Also, India has reaffirmed every time that Arunachal Pradesh has been, is and will be an integral part of India. This consistency matters diplomatically, but consistency alone does not fade a strategy built around patience and repetition.
Indian counter is reflected through infrastructure development in Tawang by constructing hydro projects, roads, bridges, military camps and 4G towers across its McMahon Line. This is turning Tawang from a remote place into an area where a soldier can conduct video calls easily. The Sela Tunnel serves as an obvious example of it being a piece of hard infrastructure, which asserts the sovereignty better than any statement.
India also issues its official responses and interacts with international partners to prevent the normalisation of Beijing’s preferred terminology. For example, Washington has chosen its side, with the US Senate adopting a bipartisan resolution confirming that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Indian territory. This gives New Delhi Western support despite China’s attempts to internationalise the naming exercise through Mandarin, Tibetan and pinyin labellings meant for the global cartographic databases.
The deeper challenge for India is in accepting the fact that it is a long waiting game without a decisive battle. The legal warfare works through accumulation, not confrontation, so the counter has to be of the same kind. It means continuing the infrastructure build up, pushing back diplomatically with each and every list, coordinating with the partners who share interests in preventing China’s assertiveness and perhaps most importantly, not letting the routine nature of those announcements dull the urgency of responding to them.
Conclusion
The thing that makes the ‘Three Warfares Strategy’ so efficient is not any particular map or statement, but the patience of building law, media and psychology into one continuous low cost strategy. Thus, no individual measure is expected to alter the territorial status quo. Each diplomatic statement and media campaign reinforces the next, gradually embedding Beijing’s narrative into official and public discourse. The Zangnan campaign is not an isolated case as it reflects a broader pattern of China’s territorial strategy. Similar measures have been taken in the South China Sea and other disputed border regions. They have just been adapted to Himalayan reality. India’s reaction of firm rejection to China’s renaming exercises along with steady strengthening of border infrastructure has remained the most durable counter as territorial claims have to meet the reality of governance and physical presence. Now, the next list of names is again expected to fall on schedule, as the timings have never been accidental.
