A robust debate has been in the public domain recently whether India should re-visit its stated policy of No-First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons as was stated in the draft nuclear doctrine of 1999 and which subsequently became official in 2003. Twenty-three years ago, India’s two nuclear armed neighbors, Pakistan had roughly 30 nuclear bombs while China was believed to have about 200. Today, Pakistan is estimated to have about 170 nuclear warheads while India is estimated to have operationally deployable 190 nuclear weapons as per Stockholm based International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2026 Yearbook. India, as per this SIPRI report, remains the world’s fifth-largest military spender with over USD 92 billion in defense expenditure in 2025. China’s nuclear arsenals are above 600 in number along with possession of huge arsenals of small tactical weapons. The end result could be a deadly cocktail of profound devastation and destruction. On top of it, both Pakistan and China have the capabilities of hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles in nuclear triad, kinetic energy weapons, AI-driven cyber war, and electronic warfare, etc.
India’s 2003 nuclear doctrine outlined a NFU policy reiterating its core nuclear policy and of using nuclear weapons only in response to direct retaliation to a nuclear attack. It added a special caveat that India retains the option to use nuclear weapons first only if it is attacked with biological or chemical weapons from its adversaries. From the perspectives of China and Pakistan, officially, both countries are signatories to the treaty on banning chemical and biological weapons. The U.S. State Department has also not found any solid evidence of acquisition of biological weapons by Pakistan. Serious concerns, however, persist on alleged China’s covert cooperation with Pakistan on the former shifting chemical weapons components to Pakistan and in assisting it for developing biological weapons such as toxin and anthrax.
Pakistan’s stance on NFU relies on ‘full-spectrum deterrence’ with the right to use nuclear weapons as a first choice even in countering a conventional military attack from India. The advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA), Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Khalid Kidwai, has outlined three thresholds on the use of nuclear option by Pakistan. One, if India attacks Pakistan and occupies a large land territory endangering its territorial integrity. Two, India decapitates a significant part of Pakistan’s three branches of its Armed forces. Three, India’s military action leads to catastrophic economic meltdown of Pakistan. It remains unclear whether Pakistan will go for a first strike if it perceives that India has a hand in regime change, military coup, massive internal destabilization, or collapse of its governance structure by pointing fingers towards India. Prior to Operation Sindoor (May 7-8 May, 2025), Pakistan’s Railway minister Hanif Abbasi on April 26, 2025, is on record of openly threatening to use nuclear weapons by utilizing Ghori, Shaheen, and Ghaznavi missiles, stating they would utilize ‘all 170 nuclear warheads pointed toward India’ and adding that ‘our nuclear missiles are not for show as they are meant for India’ should India suspend the Indus Water Treaty to the detriment of Pakistan.
From a purely deterrence discourse point of view, a tentative template on the comparative assessment of India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategies can be articulated. First, India under its 2003 nuclear doctrine relies on deterrence by punishment through a nuclear triad including ready-to-launch underground missile silos and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). India’s nuclear posture also envisages actively threatening its adversary of strong, punitive retaliation through a second strike, thus inflicting unacceptable damage and acting as a credible deterrent. For Pakistan, the policy is deterrence by denial whereby it would take military advantage by going first on the use of nuclear weapons if it foresees the failure of deterrence as imminent. Second, India’s nuclear policy has wider geographical outreach and latitude, as it faces two nuclear-armed neighbors, namely, Pakistan and China. For Pakistan, its policy is mostly one country-specific (India). Third, India, in its nuclear doctrine, has officially stated a No-First Use. Pakistan, on the other hand, maintains opacity, strategic ambiguity, and is disinclined to give any specific guarantee on NFU. Four, India has adhered to ‘Credible, Minimum Deterrence’. Pakistan has not stated any such clear guidelines. Five, India’s decision-making on taking any possible use of nuclear weapons is within civil political control. While in Pakistan’s case, it is under de-facto control of the Chief of Defense Forces, which was recently validated under the 27th Constitutional Amendment. Six, India has stated clearly not to resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or those not aligned with nuclear weapons powers. Pakistan, as of now, has not made any explicit stand in its nuclear policy in this regard. Seven, Kargil (1999), Operation Parakram (2001-02), and Operation Sindoor (2025) crises demonstrated a replay of deterrence stability (as was evidenced during the Cold War years between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union even amidst MAD—Mutual Assured Destruction policy). Internal/external compulsion, intervention, conciliation, and negotiation also played their part in defusing the crises at various times. Eight, on the face of it, Pakistan appears to have adopted a policy of nuclear brinkmanship while India is a leading, emerging global power in its own right, with the country currently the fourth largest economy in nominal GDP and aiming for an ambitious $5 trillion economy by 2028-29.
Use of nuclear weapons, whether through first use or as a second retaliatory strike, by all accounts, is absolutely unthinkable and unacceptable by any rational and civilizational standards. But amidst global tumult and churning with uncertainties looming all around due to fast-changing global geopolitics and strategic shifts, and with an estimated 12,187 nuclear weapons held by nine nuclear-armed states, it will be unwise on India’s part to not have a re-look and re-visit the viability of its NFU policy that was formulated over two decades ago in 2003. Furthermore, with the advent of new technologies in today’s defense sector—such as real-time satellite surveillance, hypersonic weapons, infrared tracking through AI, data fusion, and long-range cruise missiles—the logic of the survivability of nuclear weapons after a first strike has been considerably weakened and eroded. India, therefore, must in most unambiguous terms restate its nuclear redlines in a more overt and transparent manner, while at the same time embarking upon meaningful and tangible confidence-building measures in both nuclear and conventional domains. If deemed beneficial, India, for example, can revive Track-II diplomacy. Another issue that can be looked at is a more regular, structured, institutionalized mechanism under which both Indian and Pakistan’s top representatives from RAW, ISI, IB etc. can meet or use hotlines in case of an imminent crisis before it can escalate. Perhaps what is needed most is to convert a trust deficit into a trust surplus and nurture a more durable peace constituency on both sides of the border.
