The debate surrounding aircraft carriers has intensified over the past decade. Precision-guided missiles, hypersonic weapons, long-range drones and Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems have led many analysts to question whether carriers remain viable in high-intensity warfare. Yet the world’s major naval powers continue to invest heavily in them. The reason is straightforward: no other platform combines sustained air power, mobility, deterrence and political signalling in the same manner.
For India, the issue is not whether aircraft carriers are obsolete, but what kind of carriers are necessary for the strategic environment emerging in the Indo-Pacific. The challenge is particularly acute because China is rapidly expanding its naval aviation capabilities while the United States continues to retain unmatched carrier dominance. India therefore faces a narrow window in which it must define a realistic and technologically coherent maritime strategy.
The Changing Nature of Aircraft Carriers
Aircraft carriers are evolving from purely strike-oriented platforms into nodes within a wider network-centric maritime architecture. Modern carriers increasingly operate alongside satellites, unmanned systems, submarines and long-range missile forces. The future carrier battle group will rely less on massed fighter sorties and more on integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
China’s newest carrier, the Fujian, illustrates this transition. Unlike its earlier ski-jump carriers, it uses electromagnetic catapult systems (EMALS), allowing heavier aircraft launches, including airborne early warning aircraft and potentially stealth fighters. This significantly enhances sortie rates and operational reach.
The American approach has evolved similarly. The US Navy’s Gerald R. Ford-class carriers prioritise automation, electromagnetic launch systems and integration with unmanned aviation. American doctrine increasingly sees carriers as dispersed strike hubs operating alongside submarines, destroyers and long-range bombers rather than acting independently.
At the same time, carriers face unprecedented vulnerabilities. Chinese DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles are specifically designed to threaten carrier strike groups. Cheap autonomous drones, loitering munitions and undersea systems are altering the economics of naval warfare. The Ukraine conflict demonstrated how relatively inexpensive systems can degrade expensive naval platforms.
However, these vulnerabilities do not eliminate the utility of carriers. Rather, they force doctrinal adaptation. Carriers remain indispensable for sea control, expeditionary operations, disaster relief and coercive diplomacy, particularly in maritime theatres lacking extensive overseas bases.
China’s focus on Regional Dominance First
China’s carrier programme is not designed to replicate the global reach of the United States immediately. Instead, Beijing is pursuing phased regional dominance. Its objective is to establish credible naval air power across the Western Pacific and eventually sustain deployments into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) now possesses three carriers and is expected to pursue additional platforms, including nuclear-powered variants. The Fujian represents a major technological leap because it allows the launch of heavier aircraft with greater payloads and endurance.
More importantly, China’s shipbuilding ecosystem far exceeds India’s in scale and speed. Chinese yards can simultaneously build destroyers, submarines and carrier escorts at a pace unmatched by any other Asian power. This industrial depth is perhaps Beijing’s greatest maritime advantage.
China’s strategy also relies on a growing network of logistics facilities stretching from Djibouti to Gwadar and potentially Hambantota. These facilities may not yet constitute formal naval bases, but they expand Chinese operational endurance in the IOR.
For India, the concern is not an immediate Chinese carrier confrontation in the Indian Ocean. Rather, it is the gradual normalisation of sustained PLAN carrier deployments close to India’s maritime approaches.
America’s Strategy of Distributed Maritime Dominance
The United States still operates the world’s most capable carrier fleet. American carriers benefit from nuclear propulsion, superior airborne early warning capabilities and decades of combat experience.
Yet Washington is also reassessing carrier doctrine. The US Navy increasingly emphasises distributed lethality — dispersing offensive power across submarines, destroyers and unmanned systems to reduce overdependence on large carriers. American carriers are therefore evolving into command-and-control hubs within a broader combat network.
Importantly, the United States retains the industrial, technological and logistical infrastructure necessary to sustain global carrier operations. Its alliances with Japan, Australia and NATO further reinforce this capability.
India cannot replicate the American model because it lacks comparable resources and alliance structures. Attempting to imitate the US Navy would create unsustainable financial burdens. India instead requires a more focused maritime doctrine centred on the Indian Ocean.
India’s Current Position
India currently operates two aircraft carriers: INS Vikramaditya and the indigenous INS Vikrant. The latter marked a major achievement for Indian shipbuilding and demonstrated increasing domestic naval design capability.
However, India’s carrier aviation capability remains constrained by several structural limitations.
First, both Indian carriers employ STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) configurations using ski-jump launches. This restricts aircraft payloads and prevents the operation of fixed-wing airborne early warning aircraft. In contrast, catapult-equipped carriers possess significantly superior situational awareness and sortie flexibility.
Secondly, India’s carrier air wing modernisation has been slow. The MiG-29K fleet has faced maintenance and reliability issues. The acquisition of Rafale-M fighters will improve capability, but deliveries will take time.
Thirdly, India lacks sufficient nuclear-powered attack submarines to adequately screen carrier battle groups in contested waters. Carrier survivability increasingly depends on underwater escort capability.
Finally, there remains persistent bureaucratic uncertainty over India’s third carrier, often referred to as INS Vishal or IAC-2. Repeated delays have undermined long-term planning.
How India Should Charter Its Future Course
India must avoid both strategic overreach and excessive caution. A balanced carrier strategy should rest on five pillars.
Prioritise One Advanced CATOBAR Carrier
India should approve a single next-generation CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carrier rather than pursuing multiple conventional STOBAR platforms. A catapult-equipped carrier would permit operation of fixed-wing airborne early warning aircraft, heavier strike aircraft and unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
This is essential because future naval warfare will depend heavily on sensor dominance and long-range targeting. Without airborne early warning capability, Indian carriers will remain at a significant disadvantage against Chinese naval aviation.
Integrate Unmanned Systems Early
India should accelerate naval drone development for surveillance, electronic warfare and strike missions. Future carrier air wings must include autonomous systems capable of extending operational range without risking pilots.
The United States has already integrated unmanned tanker aircraft into carrier operations. India cannot afford to lag in this domain.
Expand Nuclear Submarine Capability
Carriers without submarine protection are increasingly vulnerable. India therefore requires a parallel expansion of nuclear-powered attack submarines rather than focusing exclusively on surface platforms.
The Indian Ocean’s geography favours undersea warfare. Submarines can impose substantial costs on any adversary attempting sustained deployments near Indian waters.
Develop Maritime Denial Alongside Sea Control
India should reject the false binary between carriers and missiles. It needs both. Carriers provide political influence and flexible air power, while long-range anti-ship missiles strengthen deterrence.
A balanced doctrine combining sea control and sea denial would complicate Chinese operational planning across the IOR.
Build a Genuine Maritime Industrial Base
The most important lesson from China is industrial rather than purely military. Beijing’s advantage stems from manufacturing scale, rapid shipbuilding and integrated supply chains.
India must therefore invest consistently in shipyards, propulsion systems, naval aviation and electronics manufacturing. Sporadic procurement cannot create maritime power. Long-term industrial continuity is indispensable.
Conclusion
Aircraft carriers are neither obsolete relics nor invincible symbols of power. Their future lies in adaptation. The most successful navies are redesigning carriers as components of integrated maritime combat networks rather than standalone instruments of dominance.
For India, carriers remain strategically necessary because of the country’s geography, trade dependence and regional ambitions. Yet India cannot simply imitate American global carrier doctrine, nor can it match China’s capability.
Its objective should instead be credible dominance within the Indian Ocean Region through a smaller but technologically advanced and operationally sustainable force structure. That requires difficult choices like investing in CATOBAR capability, strengthening submarine fleets, integrating unmanned systems and building a robust maritime industrial ecosystem.
India’s maritime future will ultimately depend less on the number of carriers it possesses and more on whether those carriers are embedded within a coherent and modern naval strategy.
